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Abstract 
This paper examines how the information content of dividends is related to 
corporate governance structure by using a sample of 228 announcements of 
dividend changes during 2001-2002. The empirical evidence suggests that there 
is a positive association between stock price reaction and dividend surprises. In 
addition, by using stockholdings and the degree of divergence between cash 
flow and control rights of the largest shareholder as the proxies for potential 
expropriation of minority shareholders, this paper shows that the stock price 
reaction to announcements of dividend changes is larger for firms with 
potentially greater likelihood of expropriation of minority shareholders. 
Moreover, the nonlinear ownership effects of dividend change announcements 
on stock price reaction are also strongly supported by evidence. As a whole, 
these results provide support for the agency cost hypothesis of dividend payment. 
Dividend payments, which guarantee a pro-rata payout for both large and small 
shareholders, play a critical role in limiting expropriation of minority 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The issue of dividends has been one of the most controversial topics in the 
subject of corporate finance. Economists have long been puzzled by why 
corporations pay dividends and why investors desire dividends. Agency cost 
theory of dividends, which has received wide attention in recent years, 
provides a fresh look at how dividends address agency problems by reducing 
the cash flow available to corporate insiders. 
Much of existing literature focuses on the role of dividends as a 
disciplinary mechanism in a dispersed share ownership structure: a large 
number of dispersed shareholders and employed managers who effectively 
control the company. In this situation, conflicts of interest exist mainly between 
the dispersed shareholders and entrenched manager. Dividend payments can 
reduce the cash flow available to managers, thereby preventing managers from 
investing in negative present value projects (Jensen, 1986) and they are 
monitored more frequently by the capital market in seeking new funds 
(Easterbrook, 1984). 
In most East Asian countries including Hong Kong, the share ownership is 
in fact highly concentrated. It is common for a single large shareholder or a 
tightly knitted group of shareholders to retain a controlling stake in the 
company. The controlling stake is typically retained by the founder of the 
company and by his descendants. Also, the controlling shareholder generally 
takes an active interest in running the company, by choosing the management 
and directly taking executive positions. In this situation, the main conflict in 
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corporate governance is that between the large, controlling shareholder and 
small, minority shareholders. Dividend payments, which guarantee a pro-rata 
payout for both large and small shareholders, provide an ideal device for 
limiting expropriation of minority shareholders. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between 
corporate governance structure and the information content of dividend 
changes in Hong Kong. Specifically, by examining the price response to 
dividend change announcements, this paper investigates the role of dividends 
in limiting expropriation of minority shareholders in Hong Kong. There are at 
least two important implications from corporate governance theory on the 
reaction of stock price to dividend change announcements. 
The first implication is the positive association between stock price 
reaction and dividend change announcements. The controlling shareholder, by 
paying more dividends to shareholders, can show a creditable commitment of 
not expropriating the retained earnings and of being more disciplined. On the 
other hand, dividend cuts increase the cash that the controlling shareholder can 
potentially expropriate. As a result, stock prices should react favorably to 
announcements of dividend increases and unfavorably to dividend decreases. 
The second implication is the positive relationship between the magnitude 
of stock price reaction to dividend change announcements and the potential 
expropriation of minority shareholders. Agency cost theory predicts that the 
more severe the large-small shareholder conflict, the more important are 
dividends as a means of agency cost reductions. As a result, those firms with 
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potentially large agency conflicts should experience larger stock price reaction 
than firms with small agency conflicts. 
By using a sample of 228 announcements of dividend changes over the 
period of 2001-2002, this paper finds that the stock price reacts favorably to 
announcements of unexpected dividend increases and unfavorably to 
unexpected dividend reductions. In addition, by using stockholdings and the 
degree of divergence between the cash flow and control rights of the largest 
shareholder as the proxies for potential expropriation of minority shareholders, 
this paper shows that the stock price reaction to announcements of dividend 
changes is larger for firms with potentially greater likelihood of expropriation 
of minority shareholders. 
In particular, the empirical evidence suggests that stock price reaction to 
unexpected dividend changes is positively related to stockholdings and the 
degree of divergence between the cash flow and control rights of the largest 
shareholder. Moreover, the nonlinearity of ownership effects on stock price 
reaction to announcements of dividend changes are also strongly supported by 
evidence. Overall, these results provide support for the agency cost hypothesis 
of dividends. Dividend payments, which guarantee a pro-rata payout for both 
large and small shareholders, do play an important role in mitigating agency 
conflict between the large and small shareholders in Hong Kong. 
/ 
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 is a literature review. Section 3 
presents the hypothesized regression models and interpretations. Section 4 
describes the sample criteria, data sources and variables. Section 5 reports the 
descriptive statistics and limitations. Section 6 presents the empirical findings. 
Section 7 relates the empirical results to prior literature. Section 8 is a 
conclusion. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
This section consists of three parts. The first part provides a review of 
relevant dividend literature. The second part summarizes prior evidence on 
corporate governance. Particularly, a relevant discourse on studies of 
ownership structure and corporate governance is presented. The third part 
discusses previous literature on the link between corporate governance and 
dividend policy. 
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2.1 Relevant Dividend Literature 
In this part of the literature review, the Miller and Modigliani dividend 
irrelevance proposition is first outlined. Secondly, previous empirical findings 
on the information content of dividends are summarized. Thirdly, two 
predominant explanations of the information content of dividends一cash flow 
signaling theory and agency cost theory are presented. 
2.1.1 Dividend Irrelevance Theory 
In their 1961 article on dividend policy, growth and valuation of shares, 
Miller and Modigliani (hereafter referred to as MM) show that in a world of 
perfect and complete capital markets, dividend policy is irrelevant to the value 
of the firm. 
From the firm's perspective, dividend policy is irrelevant as the value of 
the firm is determined by the earnings power of the firm's investment policy. 
Theoretically, the firms can fund the optimal investment opportunities by three 
sources. The firms can retain their profits and fund the investment policy by 
retained earnings. The firms can pay out those earning as dividends and raise 
the required capital by issuing new shares. They can also finance dividends by 
using debt. Since capital markets are perfect and complete, the manner in 
which the earnings stream is split between dividends and retained earnings 
does not affect the value of the firm. 
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From the perspective of investors, dividend policy is irrelevant as 
investors are able to replicate any desired stream of payments by appropriate 
purchases and sales of equity. If dividends are less than desired, investors can 
sell a portion of their stock to obtain the desired cash distribution. If dividends 
are more than desired, investors can use dividends to purchase additional 
shares in the company. In other words, investors are able to manufacture 
"homemade" dividends. Thus, investors should find no difference between 
returns in the form of cash dividends and returns in the form of capital gains. 
In fact, the dividend irrelevance proposition of MM rests on two 
preconditions. First, it is assumed that investment decisions of the firm are 
unaffected by its dividend decisions. Second, perfect and complete capital 
markets (symmetric information, complete contract possibilities, no taxes and 
transaction cost) are assumed to exist. Therefore, the dividend irrelevance 
proposition of MM can be interpreted as, if one of the assumptions underlying 
the result is violated, dividend policy could affect the firm value. 
2.1.2 Information Content of Dividends 
MM show that in the frictionless world, the firm's dividend policy is 
irrelevant in stock price valuation. However, capital markets are not perfect. 
mm acknowledge that dividend changes influence stock prices and attribute 
this phenomenon to the information content of dividends. The association 
between dividend changes and stock prices is obviously an empirical question 
and has been subjected to extensive empirical research. 
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In a study of dividend changes for 135 firms, Pettit (1972) found that 
abnormal price changes are associated with the announcements of dividend 
changes. Such price changes are in excess of those that can be explained by the 
movements in the market index and by the relative risk of the individual 
securities. Also, most of the price adjustments are found to take place either on 
the day of the dividend announcement or by the following day. Based on these 
results, Pettit concluded that dividend changes do convey new information to 
the market and therefore affect share prices. 
As suggested by later studies, one limitation of Pettit's study concerns the 
possible effect of simultaneous earnings announcements. Because earnings and 
dividend announcements are frequently made jointly, the large abnormal price 
changes that are observed to be associated with changes in dividends may also 
be explained by large changes in earnings that are announced at the same time. 
Pettit's study on its own does not prove that dividends rather than earnings are 
the source of the information that cause the observed abnormal price changes. 
Aharony and Swary (1980), however, are able to separate the dividends 
effect from the earnings effect by examining only the quarterly dividends that 
are announced on dates different from the dates of earnings announcements. 
They find that dividend increase, on average, result in a statistically significant 
0.35 percent positive stock price change. Price response is more pronounced 
for dividend cuts. The stock price declines of between 1.13 and 1.46 percent on 
the announcement day, and cumulative stock price declines of between 4.62 
and 5.39 percent over the two-week period preceding and including the day the 
dividend cut are announced. 
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A further study by Asquith and Mullis (1983) suggested that the 
information effect of dividends is much larger than were previously calculated 
by Aharony and Swary. They contended that studies measuring the impact of 
dividend changes on stock price captured only the difference between the 
actual change and the anticipated change that is already reflected in the share 
price. In order to examine the total effect of dividend changes on stock price 
(not just the unanticipated portion), Asquith and Mullis analyzed a sample of 
160 firms that had announced their first dividend after paying no dividends for 
at least ten years. Assuming the whole of the first dividend is unexpected, they 
find that there are statistically significant increases in the stock price from such 
dividend initiations. The abnormal returns over the two-day announcement 
period averaged 3.7 percent, compared to the 1 percent that was observed by 
Aharony and Swary. When they excluded from the sample those firms that 
announced other important information (earnings, mergers, and spin-offs) 
within twenty-one days of the dividend announcement, the results are more 
pronounced. 
To sum up, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that shares prices 
are significantly affected by changes in dividend policy. The market reacts 
positively to announcements of dividend increases and negatively to 
announcements of dividend decreases, suggesting that investors interpret these 
changes as good or bad news, respectively. However, the question of precisely 
what information is contained in dividend announcements has not been fully 
resolved. 
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As dividend research reports a strong empirical tie between dividend 
announcements and stock prices changes, to explain the observed price effects 
of dividends, cash flow signaling theory has been developed which posits that 
dividend announcements serve as a means of conveying information from 
management to investors. A brief review of cash flow signaling models and 
empirical evidence is presented as follows. 
2.1.3 Cash Flow Signaling 
According to MM (1964)，the information content of dividends is driven 
by managers' reluctance to cut dividends. As a result, a dividend cut implies a 
serious deterioration in the firm's financial prospects, whereas a dividend 
increase implies an improved future outlook for the firm. However, it was not 
until the end of the 1970s that theoretical models of dividend signaling were 
developed. 
2,1,3.1 Theoretical Models 
The basic premise in dividend-signaling models is that there is 
asymmetric information between managers and outside investors. Managers 
are motivated to release private information to the investors and to use 
dividend as signals. Also, the signal of this information must be credible. This 
means that only good firms can bear the cost of dividend payments. Since 
weaker firms have no incentive to mimic the good firms, a separating 
equilibrium will result. 
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There are several well-known dividend-signaling models. In the 
Bhattacharya model (1979)，dividends are used as an ex-ante signal of future 
cash flow. The cost of signaling is the opportunity cost of the use of internal 
funds or the transaction costs associated with external financing. In contrast, 
the cost of signaling is the increased shareholder tax liabilities and constrained 
firm liquidity (John and William model, 1985). In Miller and Rock (1985), 
dividends are not intended to be used as a signal. They suggest that investors 
draw inferences about the firm's internal operating cash flows from the 
dividend announcements. In sum, although different signaling models have 
different presumptions, they all predict the positive relationship between 
unexpected dividend changes and stock price changes. 
2,1.3,2 Empirical Evidence 
If changes in dividend policy do convey new information about future 
cash flow, dividend changes should be positively associated with subsequent 
earnings changes. To test this proposition, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner 
(1996) examined 145 firms whose annual earnings growth declined in year 
zero, after at least nine years of consecutive earnings growth. Thus, year zero 
represents the first earnings decline in many years and this year's dividend 
decision may convey a lot of information to outsiders. In particular, it can help 
the market to assess whether the decline in earnings is permanent or transitory. 
However, they find no support that favorable dividend decisions represent a 
reliable signal of superior future earnings performance. There is no evidence of 
positive future earnings surprises for the 99 firms that increased their dividends. 
Not only do the dividend-increasing firms not experience positive earnings 
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surprises in subsequent years in absolute terms, their earnings performance is 
also no better than those firms that do not change their dividend. 
By measuring earnings changes relative to the industry average changes in 
earnings (adjusted for earnings momentum and mean revision for earnings), 
Benarti, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) do the similar task and find that there is a 
very strong lagged and contemporaneous correlation between dividend changes 
and earnings changes. There is no evidence of a positive relation between 
dividend changes and future earnings changes. 
To summarize, the overall evidence does not support the argument that 
dividend changes convey information about future earning. The relation 
between dividend changes and subsequent earnings changes are opposite to 
what the theory predicts. Therefore, dividends are believed to be a lagging (or 
current) indicator instead of a leading indicator of earnings. 
As less success has been achieved in tying the information content of 
dividend announcements to an observable improvement in future cash flows or 
earnings, later studies have called the cash flow signaling theory into question 
and an alternative explanation, i.e., agency cost theory, has been put forward to 
explain the information content of dividends. The theoretical framework of 
agency cost theory of dividends and empirical evidence are summarized as 
follows. 
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2.1.4 Agency Cost Theory 
The potential agency costs associated with the separation of management 
and ownership has been recognized in economic literature for more than two 
decades (Jensen and Meckling，1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a,b). The agency 
theory of dividends suggests that dividends can play a critical role in mitigating 
the agency costs associated with the separation of corporate ownership and 
control. 
2,1.4.1 Theoretical Models 
Easterbrook (1984) suggested that the payment of dividends, by causing 
firms to visit the capital markets more frequently for financing needs, brings 
managers under greater scrutiny of capital markets. By paying dividends to 
shareholders, the firm makes a quasi-fixed commitment to pay out cash at 
regular intervals. This commitment reduces the discretionary resources under 
the control of managers and subjects them to greater monitoring by capital 
markets that occurs when the firm seeks new capital. In sum, Easterbrook's 
analysis predicts that the market responds positively to dividend increase 
announcements because it incorporates the value of additional monitoring into 
the stock price. 
An alternative agency cost explanation for the relevance of dividends is 
offered by Jensen (1986), who hypothesizes that cash balances in excess of 
managers needed to fund positive net present value projects are likely to be 
wasted on inefficient expansion. Jensen argues that managers have incentives 
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to expand the corporation beyond its optimal size because this increases the 
resources under managerial control. Also, inefficient expansion is beneficial for 
managers since executive compensation is positively related to firm size. 
Consequently, if the corporation has substantial excess funds, managers will 
often invest in negative net present value (NPV) projects. Based on this 
argument, Jensen suggests that the partial solution to this problem is the 
dividend payouts. Dividend payments reduce the free cash flow available to 
managers, thereby preventing them from investing in negative NPV projects 
and perquisite consumption. 
Hence, Jensen's (1986) free cash flow hypothesis predicts that a dividend 
increase by a firm with free cash flow problems will reduce the market's 
estimate of the amount of cash that will be wastefully invested, causing an 
increase in firm value. 
2,1.4,2 Empirical Evidence 
One important implication of the free cash flow hypothesis is that the 
overinvestment problem is likely to be more pronounced in cash-rich 
companies that are devoid of growth opportunities. Therefore, an increase in 
dividends should have a greater and positive price impact for firms that 
overinvest than for firms that do not. 
Based on this idea, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) used Tobin's q，the ratio 
of the market value of assets to the replacement cost of assets, as a measure of 
a firm's investment opportunities to test the free cash flow hypothesis. They 
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asserted that having a Tobin's q value of less than 1 is a sufficient condition for 
a firm to be categorized as overinvesting. By segmenting their sample into 
high-q ( q � l ) and low-q (q<l) firms, Lang and Litzenberger find that for 
dividend-increase announcements, low-q firms experience a larger price 
appreciation than high-q firms do. For dividend-decrease announcements, 
low-q firms also experience a more dramatic price drop. They argue that the 
greater effect of dividend changes on low-q firms is consistent with the free 
cash flow hypothesis. They also conclude that the market places a high value 
on dividends that remove cash from the control of managers who have poor 
investment opportunities. 
Their conclusions are disputed in the later work of Denis, Denis, and Sarin 
(1994), which repeated the Lang and Litzenberger experiment over a longer 
time period. They argued that the negative relation between Tobin's Q and the 
stock price reaction to dividend changes may be due to a negative relation 
between dividend yield and Tobin's Q. By using a sample of 6,777 dividend 
changes between 1962 and 1998, they documented a symmetric reaction to 
dividend changes between high and low Tobin's Q firm, when they controlled 
for the level of dividend yield, firm size, and the magnitude of the change in 
the dividend yield. They also found that capital expenditures increased 
following dividend increases and decreased following dividend decreases 
regardless of the level of Tobin's Q，which supports the cash flow signaling 
hypothesis. Yooh and Starks (1995) also performed similar tests and again 
found in favor of the signaling hypothesis, and against the free cash flow 
hypothesis. 
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To sum up, the agency cost explanation of information content of 
dividends is far from conclusive as the empirical evidence is rather mixed. 
More refined test is needed to shed light on this argument. 
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2.2 Relevant Literature on Corporate Governance 
Up to this point, a brief review of dividend literature related to the 
information content of dividends has been outlined. In this part of the literature 
review, prior findings on ownership structure and corporate governance are 
summarized to provide a closer look at corporate governance in Hong Kong. 
Specifically, a general picture of ownership structure in Hong Kong is first 
described. Then the agency problems that are associated with the ownership 
structure are discussed. 
2.2.1 Ownership Structure in Hong Kong 
Ownership structure in Hong Kong is characterized by the dominance of 
one primary owner or by a tightly knit group of family members. The dominant 
shareholder, typically a founder or his immediate family, holds a significant 
number of shares. Besides, the dominant shareholder usually participates in 
firm management directly or indirectly through top managers, and influences 
most of the management decision. In particular, most of Hong Kong-listed 
firms are managed through blood and marriage ties. Many of these family 
members actively participate in the daily operations of their firms by 
appointing themselves or trusted relatives and colleagues as senior executives 
or board directors. 
These distinctive features of ownership structure in Hong Kong are also 
confirmed by recent evidence. For example, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanies, and 
Shleifer (1999) investigated the control structures of the twenty largest publicly 
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traded corporations in 27 rich countries, including Hong Kong. By tracing back 
the ownership into firms that are widely held and firms that have ultimate 
owner, they find that Hong Kong companies, on average, have more 
concentrated ownership comparing with the firms in other 26 countries except 
Mexico. The concentrated ownership is usually in the hands of family. 
Claessens, Djankov, Lang (2000) also carry out a similar task for 2980 
publicly-traded companies in nine East Asian countries including Hong Kong. 
They find that the separation of management from ownership control is rare in 
Hong Kong. More than two-thirds of Hong Kong companies have managers 
who are a member of the controlling owner's family. 
2.2.2 Ownership Concentration 
As discussed above, corporate ownership structure in Hong Kong is 
characterized by the dominance of the controlling family who also participates 
in the firm's management. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that the 
greater alignment of manager and shareholder interests as management stock 
ownership increase. However, there is also a potential downside to high 
ownership concentration. Shleifer and Vishney (1997) argued that when 
ownership concentration increases to a level where an owner obtains effective 
control, the nature of agency problems shifts away from conflicts between the 
manager and shareholders to conflicts between the controlling owner and 
minority shareholders. This conflict can take several forms一from the 
diversion of corporate earnings to the advantage of the controlling shareholders 
to the use of the company's assets to favor other companies owned by them. 
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The agency conflicts associated with high ownership concentration have 
also been subjected to several empirical studies. The study of Morck, Schleifer, 
and Vishny (1988) examines the relationship between the ownership 
concentration (manager with high managerial holdings of firm) and firm 
valuation. They document that the relationship is not positive throughout. By 
using Tobin's Q as the measurement of firm valuation, Morck et al. (1988) 
show that firm value first increases, then decreases and increases again as 
ownership concentration increases. They declare that the non-monotonic 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm values is the result of 
two different effects and each of them dominates in different ranges of 
ownership concentration. 
The first effect is the convergence-of-interest hypothesis, which predicts 
that a firm's market value increases with the rising ownership concentration. 
As the management has more shares of a firm, managers themselves have more 
incentive to manage the firm and increase the firm's value. This hypothesis 
dominates in the first and last range of a firm's ownership concentration. The 
second effect is the entrenchment hypothesis, which predicts that a firm's 
market value decreases with the rising ownership concentration. Morck et al. 
(1988) suggest that the relatively high ownership concentration can entrench 
management from the discipline of the market for corporate control, thereby 
enabling managers to better act in their own interest and lower the firm's value. 
This hypothesis dominates in the middle range of corporate ownership 
concentration. In sum, these results provide support for entrenchment effect of 
high ownership concentration. 
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2.2.3 Separation of Cash Flow Rights and Control Rights 
In addition to the characteristic concentrated ownership, most East Asian 
corporations are characterized by a complicated ownership structure, and a 
large separation of voting from cash flow rights. For example, by tracing back 
the ownership with the ultimate owner of 2980 publicly-traded companies in 
nine East Asian countries, Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) find that the 
controlling shareholders in East Asian corporations typically have control over 
the firm in excess of their cash flow rights. Control is often enhanced through 
the use of pyramid structures, cross-holdings and deviations from the one share 
one vote. 
Based on this distinguishing feature of East Asian corporations, Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002) investigated the entrenchment effect associated 
with the separation of ownership and control. They documented that the 
corporate performance is negatively related to the divergence between the cash 
flow and control rights of the largest ultimate owner, and it in turns reflects the 
degree of expropriation of minority shareholders. By using the market-to-book 
ratio as the measurement of firm valuation, they find that the higher cash-flow 
rights of the controlling shareholder are associated with the higher market 
valuation of firms, which is consistent with the incentive effect. On the other 
hand, higher control rights of the controlling shareholder are associated with 
lower market valuation. The negative effect of control is more pronounced if 
there is a sharp divergence between the cash flow and control rights. They 
declare that these results provide evidence of the expropriation of minority 
shareholders. 
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Their empirical findings are also consistent with earlier theoretical 
frameworks, which predict that large potential agency conflicts are associated 
with the separation of cash flow rights and control rights. For example, 
Bebchuck, Kraakman, and Triantis (1999) argue that such ownership structure 
can create agency costs an order of magnitude larger than the costs associated 
with controlling shareholders who also have a majority of the cash-flow rights 
in their corporation. This is because the size of agency costs increases at a 
sharply increasing rate as the size of cash flow rights decreases. 
To summarize, in Hong Kong with concentrated ownership by controlling 
families, the main conflict in governance is the conflict between the large 
shareholders and minority shareholders. Therefore, the potential expropriation 
of minority shareholders, which has received wide attention in recent years, is 
one of the key concerns of corporate governance in Hong Kong. 
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2.3 Relevant Literature on Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy 
Dividend policy is one of the important financial decisions and is 
obviously affected by corporate governance of firms. In this part of literature 
review, the prior research on the link between corporate governance and 
dividend policy are summarized. 
2.3.1 Corporate Governance and Dividend Payout Levels 
Although there has been a considerable amount of research on both 
corporate governance and dividend policy, the empirical evidence of the 
relation between corporate governance and dividend policy is limited. The 
study by La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanies, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) (henceforth 
referred to LLSV) is one of few studies that analyze explicitly the impact of 
corporate governance characteristics (degree of shareholder protection in the 
firm's country of incorporation) on dividend policy. They examine the relation 
between investors' protection and dividend policy and test two hypotheses. 
The first is the substitution hypothesis, which predicts that management 
would pay more dividends in those countries where investor protection is not 
high. This hypothesis asserts that the market force and the resulted dividends 
are "substitute" for effective investor protection. As firms want to raise 
external funds in the capital market, firms in countries with poor investor 
protection would pay out more dividends voluntarily to establish their 
reputation. It is especially the case for firms with higher growth prospects. The 
second is the outcome hypothesis, which predicts that those countries with 
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good investor protection would pay more dividends. This hypothesis suggests 
that dividends are the "outcome" of legal protection. Shareholders utilize their 
legal powers to force management to disgorge more cash flow as dividends. 
By using the sample of 4000 large firms from 33 countries, La Porta et al. 
(2000) found that firms in countries with better investor protection make higher 
dividend payouts than do firms in countries with lower investor protection. 
Moreover, in countries with more legal protection, high-growth firms had 
lower payout ratios. Their findings support the outcome hypothesis, which 
states that investors use their legal power to force dividends when growth 
prospects are low. There is also no evidence to show that in countries with low 
investor protection, management will voluntarily commit itself to paying out 
higher dividends. 
In addition, Faccoi, Lang and Young (2001) extended their work and 
document that the dividend policy is related to whether the corporation is 
tightly affiliated to a business group or not. By using the degree of divergence 
between the cash flow and control rights as a proxy for potential agency 
problems, they found that a large divergence between the cash flow and control 
rights is associated with a lower level of dividends in Asian countries, where 
loosely affiliated corporations are widespread. On the other hand, corporations 
with large divergence between the cash flow and control rights pay 
significantly higher dividend levels in Western Europe, where corporations are 
mainly tightly affiliated. 
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Faccoi, Lang and Young (2001) provided explanations for these findings. 
They suggested that the association between potential agency problems and 
dividend levels probably depends on the market's anticipation of expropriation 
by the controlling shareholder. As shareholders are less alert to potential 
expropriation by loosely affiliated corporations in Asian countries, high 
potential agency problems are associated with low dividend payouts. This 
result provides support for the outcome hypothesis. In contrast, as shareholders 
are able to anticipate the expropriation by tightly affiliated corporations in 
Western Europe, they would demand higher dividend payouts. Consequently, 
high potential agency problems are associated with high dividend payouts, 
which is consistent with the substitution hypothesis. 
2.3.2 Corporate Governance and Stock Price Reaction to Dividend 
Changes 
Instead of relating corporate governance to dividend payouts, corporate 
governance is also potentially associated with the price effects of dividend 
change announcements. The study by Dewenter and Warther (1998) is the one 
that investigates how Japanese governance structures differ from those in the 
United States and how such differences affect stock price reactions to dividend 
announcements. 
In Japan, many companies are bound together in industrial groupings 
(keiretsu) that involve horizontal and vertical linkages among member 
companies. Also, keiretsu companies usually have interlocking boards of 
directors with senior managers sitting on each other's boards. Owning to this 
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unique governance structure, Dewenter and Warther suggested that Japanese 
and U.S. firms would have some important differences in terms of corporate 
monitoring and information sharing. These differences in turn affect the role of 
dividends. For instance, if keiretus structures are supposed to have less 
information asymmetry between managers and investors, dividend 
announcements may have a smaller pricing effect in Japan than in the United 
States. Additionally, if keiretsu and main bank monitoring of managers is 
effective, then dividend payments may not be necessary to reduce managers' 
tendency to overinvest free cash flow. 
By using the event study of dividend omission and initiation 
announcements, Dewenter and Warther documented that the pricing effect of 
dividend announcements is much smaller in Japan than in the United States. 
These results hold even after controlling for concurrent earnings 
announcements, the number of years that dividends were paid/not paid, and tax 
clientele effects. They concluded that the diminished role for dividends in 
Japan is consistent with both asymmetric information and agency cost 
explanations of dividends. The Japanese governance style can provide a more 
effective monitoring mechanism and reduce the effect of dividend policies on 
share prices in Japan compared with the situation in the United States. 
To summarize, a strong association between corporate governance and 
dividend policy is well documented in the recent empirical evidence. However, 
the question of precisely how corporate governance is related to dividend 
policy is inconclusive. Inspired by these findings, this paper attempts to 
investigate the relationship between corporate governance and the information 
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content of dividend changes in Hong Kong. Specifically, by examining the 
pricing effects of dividend change announcements, this paper examines the role 
of dividends for limiting expropriation of minority shareholders in Hong Kong. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
As stated above, share ownership is highly concentrated in Hong Kong. It 
is common that a single large shareholder or a tightly knit group of 
shareholders retains a controlling stake in the company. The controlling 
shareholder typically participates in firm management directly or indirectly 
through top managers, and influences most of the management decisions. 
Accordingly, the major conflict in the governance of Hong Kong corporations 
is between the large, controlling shareholder and small, minority shareholders. 
Agency cost theory of dividends suggests that dividend payments can 
mitigate the agency conflicts by reducing the cash flow for corporate insiders. 
In order to investigate the role of dividends as disciplinary mechanism in Hong 
Kong, two implications are derived from the agency cost hypothesis and tested 
empirically in this paper. The hypothesis development, regression models and 
interpretations of each implication are presented in the remaining part of this 
chapter. 
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3.1 Stock Price Reaction to Dividend Change Announcements 
3.1.1 Hypothesis Development 
The first implication of agency cost hypothesis of dividends is the positive 
association between stock price reaction and dividend change announcements. 
Recent research on corporate governance of East Asian corporations 
documents the potential expropriation by the controlling shareholder (Shleifer 
and Vishney 1997). Typically, the controlling shareholder has the incentive and 
ability to seek other forms of compensation from expropriation than pro-rata 
dividends. This incentive arises because the controlling shareholder bears only 
a fraction of costs (forgone dividend payments in the proportion of his cash 
flow rights) but receives the full benefits of expropriation. Also, the controlling 
shareholder has the ability to extract private benefits, as he/she is able to 
exercise complete control of the company through his/her influence on 
management decisions. 
Therefore, the controlling shareholder, by paying more dividends to 
outside shareholders, can make a creditable commitment of not expropriating 
the retained earnings and of being more disciplined. On the other hand, 
dividend cuts increase the cash that the controlling shareholder can potentially 
expropriate. As a result, outside shareholders would prefer to see an increase in 
dividends and so the stock prices should react favorably (unfavorably) to 
unexpected dividend increases (decreases) respectively. 
28 
3.1.2 Regression Model 
Based on this first implication of agency cost hypothesis of dividends, the 
following model is introduced 
CAR = e + blUD + b2CE + u (1) 
where CAR is cumulative abnormal return, a measure of the market's reaction 
to dividend change announcements, UD is unexpected dividend changes, and 
CE is the change in concurrent earnings. As earnings and dividend 
announcements are made jointly in Hong Kong, change in concurrent earnings 
is included to control for the impact of simultaneous earning announcements. 
3.1.3 Interpretations 
The coefficient bl is the marginal effect of unexpected dividend changes 
on stock prices, which measures the stock price reaction per unit of unexpected 
dividend changes. Coefficient bl can also be interpreted as the information 
content of dividends. A statistical significance of coefficient bl implies that the 
changes in dividends do provide new information that affects the stock price. If 
the agency cost hypothesis is found to be supportive, the coefficient bl should 
be positive and to be statistically significant. That is, the stock prices react 
favorably to announcements of unexpected dividend increases and unfavorably 
to unexpected dividend decreases. Also, a positive coefficient for CE is 
expected, as the market is always greeted with an increase in concurrent 
earnings. 
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3.2 Ownership Structure and Stock Price Reaction to Dividend Changes 
3.2.1 Hypothesis Development 
The second implication of agency cost hypothesis of dividends is the 
positive relationship between the magnitude of stock price reaction to dividend 
change announcements and the potential expropriation of minority 
shareholders. Agency cost theory predicts that the more severe are the 
large-small shareholder agency conflicts of firms, the more important are 
dividend payment as a means of agency cost reductions. As a result, those 
firms with potentially large agency conflicts before announcements should 
experience larger stock price reaction than do firms with small agency conflicts. 
In this paper, stockholdings and the degree of divergence between the cash 
flow and control rights of the largest shareholder are used as the proxies for the 
potential agency conflicts of firms. The explanation and hypothesized impact 
of these two variables are as follows. 
Stockholdings of the largest shareholder is proxy for the potential 
expropriation of minority shareholders as the ability to extract private benefit 
depends on share ownership by the largest shareholder. The higher 
stockholdings imply the higher ability for the controlling shareholder to extract 
private benefit from minority shareholder through his/her increased control of 
firm. Therefore, agency cost hypothesis predicts that the higher stockholdings 
the largest shareholder possess, the larger potential agency conflicts that 
associated with the firm and so the more informative of dividend change 
announcements will become. 
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The degree of divergence between the cash flow rights and control rights 
of the largest shareholder is also used to proxy for the potential expropriation 
of minority shareholders. Several empirical studies have found that the 
negative effect of control of the largest shareholder is more pronounced if there 
is a sharp divergence between the cash flow and control rights (Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan and Lang 2002). The control is enhanced through the use of 
pyramids, deviation from one-share-one vote rule. As a result, agency cost 
hypothesis predicts that the larger divergence between the cash flow rights and 
control rights of the largest shareholder, the higher the potential agency 
conflicts that are associated with the firm and the more informative the 
dividend change announcements will become. 
To summarize, the second implication of agency cost of dividends 
predicts that the firm's potential agency conflicts, as proxied by the 
stockholdings and the degree of divergence between the cash flow and control 
rights of the largest shareholder, are positively related to the sensitivity of stock 
price reaction to unexpected dividend changes. 
3.2.2 Regression Models 
As refers to the excess return regression model that was discussed above 
CAR = 0 + blUD + b2CE + u (1) 
where CAR is a measure of the market's reaction to dividend change 
announcements, UD is an unexpected dividend change and CE is the change in 
concurrent earnings. 
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In order to examine the second implication of agency costs of dividends, 
this paper hypothesizes that the marginal effect of a given unexpected dividend 
change on stock prices (coefficient bl) varies with potential agency conflicts of 
firms. Specifically, the coefficient bl is an increasing function of the proxies 
for the potential agency conflicts of firms before dividend announcements. 
That is, 
bl =/(major, 0/C) (2) 
where bl is the marginal effect of unexpected dividend changes on stock prices, 
major is the stockholdings of the largest shareholder and 0/C is the ratio of 
cash flow to control rights of the largest shareholder. A smaller 0/C indicates a 
higher degree of divergence between cash flow and control rights. 
3.2.2.1 Linear Functional Form 
Firstly, a linear functional form of (2) is introduced in the following 
bl - al + a2major + a30/C (3) 
By substituting coefficient bl from equation (3) into the regression model (1), 
one can get 
CAR 二 e + (al + a2major + a30/C)UD + b2CE + u 
CAR = 0 + alUD + a2major*UD + a30/C*UD + b2CE + u (4) 
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3,2.2,2 Quadratic Functional Form 
In addition, some empirical evidence documents the non-monotonicities 
between ownership concentration and firm's valuation. The entrenchment 
effect of large shareholder is found to dominate in one specific range of 
ownership concentration (Morck et al. 1988). If this is the case, the linear 
functional form of (2) may not be adequate and a quadratic functional form is 
introduced in this paper. Specifically, this paper hypothesizes a nonlinear 
relationship between the value of coefficient bl and the variable major by 
including squared values of the variable "major". That is, 
bl = a l + a2major + a30/C + a4major^ (5) 
By substituting coefficient bl from equation (5) into the regression model (1), 
one can get 
CAR 二 e + (al + a2major + a30/C + a4major^)UD + b2CE + u 
CAR= e + alUD + a2major*UD + a30/C*UD + a4major^*lID + b2CE + u (6) 
To sum up, the positive relationship between the magnitude of stock price 
reaction to unexpected dividend changes and the potential agency conflicts of 
firms in agency cost hypothesis is examined by using model (4) and (6). 
3.2.3 Interpretations 
If the agency cost hypothesis is supported, one expects to obtain positive 
coefficient on a2. That is, the marginal effect of unexpected dividend changes 
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on stock prices (coefficient bl) increases as the shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder increases. In addition, the agency cost hypothesis predicts a 
negative coefficient on a3. The marginal effect of unexpected dividend changes 
on stock prices (coefficient bl) increases as 0/C decreases. Furthermore, the 
statistical significance of coefficient a4 implies that the marginal effect of an 
unexpected dividend change on stock prices (coefficient bl) changes at a 
nonlinear rate as the stockholdings of the largest shareholder increases. 
To summarize, the agency cost hypothesis predicts that if dividends do 
play an important role in limiting expropriation of minority shareholders by 
removing corporate wealth from insider control, the empirical evidence should 
support (I) a positive association between stock price reaction and dividend 
change announcements; and (II) firms with potentially large agency conflicts 
before announcements would experience larger stock price reactions than do 
firms with small agency conflicts. 
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Chapter 4 Data Description 
In this section, the sample criteria and data sources are first summarized. The 
key variables to be used in the regression models are then outlined. 
4.1 Sample Criteria 
The construction of the data sample started with all dividend change 
announcements made by Hong Kong-listed firms in the Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong during the sample period 2001 and 2002. Dividend change is 
defined as relative to the previous year's value. That is, there is a dividend 
change if the interim (final) dividend per share this year is higher/lower than 
the interim (final) dividend per share last year. For a dividend change to be 
included in the sample, the following criteria must be satisfied: 
1. Dividend changes are greater than 10 percent. 
2. Special dividends or stock dividends or quarterly cash dividends are not 
issued during the dividend change period or preceding the dividend change 
period. 
3. Firms whose dividends change from a positive number to zero (omission) 
or from zero to a positive number (initiations) are excluded. 
4. Stock splits or stock consolidations do not occur during the dividend 
change period. 
5. In estimating the abnormal returns, firms whose coefficient for market 
index in the standard market model is not statistically significant at 10 
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percent level are excluded. 
6. The firm is not a financial company. 
Restrictions (l)-(4) are commonly adopted by many empirical 
examinations on the information content of dividends (Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 
1994; Lang and Litzenberger, 1989). Restriction (5) is made as an addition 
screening that eliminates the potential error in the estimation of abnormal 
returns. It is recognized that the actual daily return of some stocks may deviate 
drastically from the performance of the market index. In order to ensure that 
the market equation is generally applicable to the stock in estimating the 
abnormal returns, those firms that the coefficient for market index is not 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level would not be used for further 
analysis. Restriction (6) is used to accommodate for the dividend expectations 
model in this paper. As dividend expectations model involves accounting data 
and accounting practices that are different for financial institutions, only 
dividend announcements made by nonfinancial firms are included. 
A total of 391 dividend change announcements fulfill criteria 1-4. The 
additional screening (5) leaves samples of 251 dividend change announcements. 
Exclusion of financial firms further excludes 23 dividend announcements. The 
remaining 228 announcements consist of 114 dividend increases and 114 
dividend decreases. The sample selection procedures are reported in Table lA 
and B. 
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4.2 Data Sources 
Dividend per share and the announcement dates are collected from the 
web page of Clearing and Exchange of Hong Kong. Appendix A1 to A8 show 
the announcement dates and financial years of the sample by year of 
declaration. The daily stock prices (Datatype 二 P) and the Datastream market 
index of Hong Kong (Datatype = TOTMKHK) are obtained from the 
Datastream International database. Appendix B shows the detailed descriptions 
of Datatype used in this paper. The data on ownership structures are collected 
from the Wardleycards, which is a publication of the HSBC Broking (Data 
Services) Limited. It offers information on the identities and percentage 
shareholdings of all substantial shareholders of firms listed in Hong Kong. 
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4.3 Variables 
In order to examine empirically the regression model discussed in the 
previous section, the key variables of interest is a measure of stock price 
reaction (CAR), unexpected dividend changes (UD), stockholdings of the 
largest shareholder (major) and the ratio of cash flow to control rights of the 
largest shareholder (0/C). This section outlines the variables to be used in the 
regression models for further empirical examination. 
4.3.1 Stock Price Reaction 
The standard event study methodology and the market model are 
employed to calculate the abnormal returns around the dividend announcement 
days. To study the stock price reaction to dividend announcements, this paper 
estimates that a market model over the period from 114 trading days to 15 days 
before the announcement (t = -114 to t = -15), by using Datastream market 
index of Hong Kong (Datatype 二 TOTMKHK) as a proxy for the market index. 
Datastream market index of Hong Kong is used as a proxy for the market index 
as it approximately included 130 Hong Kong stocks. The abnormal returns 5 
days before and 5 days after the announcement days are summed up as the 
11-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each announcement. 
4.3.2 Unexpected Dividend Changes 
In event studies, the stock prices should react only to the unexpected or 
surprise element in the dividend change. In fact, many empirical studies 
measure the unexpected change in dividends as the total change in dividends. 
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However, rather than interpreting all dividend changes as being unexpected, a 
dividend expectations model is incorporated in this study. 
In order to capture the expected change in dividends, all relevant 
information that is available prior to dividend change announcements are put as 
the explanatory variables in the dividend expectations model. Any realized 
dividend changes that cannot be explained by these explanatory variables are 
then hypothesized as the unexpected component of dividend changes. In other 
words, the residuals from a dividend expectations model are estimated as the 
unexpected dividend changes (UD). In the following, the details of dividend 
expectations model used in this paper are presented. 
4.3,2,1 Determinants of Expected Dividend Changes 
Dividend change variable (dchange) is measured as dividend change per 
share relative to the stock price 10 days prior to the announcement. The 
market's expectation of dividend changes is developed based on the variables 
that have been suggested by previous studies: firm characteristics, investment 
opportunities, undistributed cash flow, earnings and leverage. All variables are 
the information that is available prior to dividend change announcements. The 
explanation and hypothesized effect of the explanatory variables in the 
dividend expectations model are described below. 
In terms of firm characteristics, the firm size (logmv) and dividend yield 
(dyield) are well documented to have an effect on dividend changes. Firm size 
is defined as the natural log of market value of firms. As larger firms are 
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expected to have less information asymmetry, it implies that large firms are less 
likely to change dividends as a means to convey information for signaling 
(Brennan and Hughes, 1991). For the dividend yield, it is measured as the 
actual dividends in the previous years divided by the stock prices. Since equity 
values are equal to the present value of future dividends, it is expected that 
high dividend yield firms tend to increase their dividends at a slower rate than 
low yield firms (Yooh and Stark 1995). 
The proxies for firm's investment opportunities include the growth in fixed 
asset (gf-i) and total asset (ga-i). It is expected that the greater the firm's growth 
opportunities, the greater the firm's need to retain earnings to finance capital 
expenditure, and so the lower the likelihood of dividends to increase (LLSV, 
2000). 
The proxies for firm's undistributed cash flow include the growth in cash 
and cash equivalents (gc-i), and the growth in working capital (gw-i). The 
residual theory states that firms will pay out its free cash flow to shareholders. 
Firms that announced dividend increases tend to have a higher level of 
undistributed cash level prior to the events (Lie, 2000). It is expected that the 
larger the firm's cash flow, the higher the possibility of the firm to pay out its 
cash flow as dividends. 
Earnings (ge-i, gie) are included as one of the determinant of the change in 
dividends. Lintner (1956) model suggests that most companies appear to have a 
target payout ratio. Any dividend changes are then the partial adjustment 
process towards a target ratio as a result of the change in earnings. It implies 
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that firms tend to increase (decrease) dividends if they experienced significant 
increases (decreases) in earnings in the year before announcement. 
The proxy for leverage is the growth in total liabilities (gl-i). Jensen (1986) 
suggests that debt and dividends are substitutes. Therefore, a higher leverage 
may lower the need for dividends to be increased. 
4.3.2,2 Dividend Expectations Models 
In the following, interim and final dividend expectations models are 
developed separately. 
The interim dividend expectations model is 
dchange = a + pilogmv + p2dyield + p3gf-i + P4ga-i + p5gc-i + p6gw-i + 
p7ge-i + p8gl-i + e 
The final dividend expectations model is 
dchange 二 a + pilogmv + (32dyield + p3gf-i + p4ga-i + p5gc-i + |36gw-i + 
p7ge-i+p8gl-i + p9gie + e 
where 
dchange = change in dividend per share relative to the stock price 10 days prior 
to the dividend announcement 
logmv 二 natural log of market value 10 days prior to the dividend 
announcement 
dyield = dividend yield 10 days prior to the dividend announcement 
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gf-1 = growth in fixed assets 
ga-i = growth in total assets 
gc-i = growth in cash and cash equivalents 
gw-i= growth in working capital 
ge-i = growth in annual profit before taxation 
gl-i = growth in total liabilities 
gie = growth in interim profit before taxation 
e = error term 
in which -1 is the last fiscal year before dividend change announcements. 
Table 2 explains the construction of variables. Table 3 A and B report summary 
statistics for the variables used in interim and final dividend expectations 
models, respectively. As financial periods are different in different firms, it can 
be noted that company data are collected from different financial years. For 
instance, for the firms with accounting periods ended on 31 December, their 
final dividends that declared in sampling period 2001 belong to 2000 fiscal 
year. All growth variables, for example, the growth in total assets, are 
calculated as (total assets in 1999 fiscal year — total assets in 1998 fiscal year) / 
total assets in 1998 fiscal year. In contrast, for firms with accounting periods 
ended on 31 March, their final dividends that were declared in the sampling 
period 2001 also belonged to the 2001 fiscal year. The variables of growth in 
total assets, are then calculated as (total assets in 2000 fiscal year — total assets 
in 1999 fiscal year) / total assets in 1999 fiscal year. 
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4,3,2.3 Empirical Results 
The cross-sectional ordinary least square regressions (OLS) are employed 
in the dividend expectations models. The regression results of interim and final 
dividend expectations models are shown in Table 4A and B, respectively. It is 
recognized that the linear expectations model is well specified for interim 
dividend changes but it is not well specified for final dividend changes. After 
excluding the dependent variables that have small t-statistics，the dividend 
expectations models are re-estimated and the results of interim and final 
dividend expectations models are reported in Table 5A and B, respectively. 
In interim dividend expectations model, the coefficient for logmv, dyield, 
ga-i, gc-i, ge-i are all statistically significant and have predictable signs. The 
signs of these independent variables can be explained as follows. The negative 
coefficient for logmv may be related to the greater degree of information 
asymmetry for small firms and the consequent need for dividend signaling. The 
negative coefficient for dyield is consistent with the idea that there is less room 
for dividends to be increased if the dividend yield of firm is already high. The 
negative coefficient for ga-i implies that firms with growth opportunities would 
pay out fewer dividends, as they have greater need for financing capital 
expenditure. The positive coefficient for gc-i is consistent with the residual 
theory of dividend that firms will disgorge the idle cash to shareholders. The 
positive coefficient for ge-i is consistent with earlier empirical findings that 
dividend is better to be the lagging indicator of earnings of firms (Benartzi et al, 
1997). 
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For the final dividend expectations model, the coefficients for dyield, gc-i, 
gw-i are statistically significant. The negative coefficient for dyield can be 
explained by the same reason as in interim dividend expectations model. The 
positive coefficient for gw-i implies that firms with high liquidity will 
distribute more cashflow as dividends. The negative coefficient for gc-i is 
surprising. It may be due to the excess time lag that is incorporated in this 
model. A large amount of net income is reported as an accounts receivable that 
has not yet been received, instead of as cash and cash equivalents. Ideally, all 
information (but not only the growth in interim earnings) that is disclosed in 
the interim report before final dividend changes should be included in the final 
dividend expectations model. However, this approach is problematic because 
the 2000 interim report for most of the firms does not contain balance sheets 
and cash flow statements. 
To conclude, the residuals from these reduced dividend expectations 
models are measured as the unexpected dividend changes (UD). 
4.3.3 Ownership Structure 
The stockholdings of the largest shareholder (major) are measured as the 
percentage shareholdings by the largest shareholder relative to the total number 
of shares outstanding. If there is a divergence between the cash flow and 
control rights, the variable major is then measured as the percentage control 
rights of the largest shareholder. It is important to note that this paper does not 
distinguish among the shareholder's names and uses one family group as the 
unit of analysis. 
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The degree of divergence between the cash flow and control rights of the 
largest shareholder (0/C) is measured as the ratio of cash flow to control rights 
of the largest shareholder. Similar to the earlier studies of La Porta 
Lopez-De-Silanies, and Shleifer (1999) mentioned above, the data on cash flow 
and control rights is obtained by tracing the ultimate ownership of each firm. 
For example, Mr. Ng Teng Fong is the largest shareholder of Sino Land. 
Pyramiding potentially induces a wedge between cash flow and his control 
rights. It works in the following manner: Mr. Ng Teng Fong owns 71.72 
percent of the stock of Tsim Sha Tsui Properties, which in turn has 52.72 
percent of the stock of Sino Land. If we look at control rights, we would say 
that Mr. Ng Teng Fong controls 52.72 percent of Sino Land (i.e. the weakest 
link in the chain of voting rights). In contrast, we would say that Mr. Ng Teng 
Fong owns about 37.81 percent of the cash flow rights of Sino Land (i.e. the 
product of the two ownership stakes along the chain). The cash flows rights to 
control rights ratio (0/C) of Sino Land is calculated as 37.81 percent / 52.72 
percent. That is, the 0/C ratio of Sino Land is 0.72. 
4.3.3.1 Centering 
A scale transformation is a rescaling by adding or subtracting constants 
from variables. Such a transformation is also referred to as centering. It is well 
documented that centering has no effect on regression coefficient (and 
t-statistics) of the interaction terms. Instead, it introduces some of the desirable 
properties of centered data. Firstly, centering variables often help minimize the 
problems of multicollinearity (see Marquardt, 1980). Secondly, centering can 
45 
render more meaningful interpretations of the regression coefficient for UD. 
Therefore, variables "major" and "0/C" are centered in the regression model. 
Specifically, it performs an additive transformation on the percentage 
shareholdings (major) by subtracting the mean shareholdings from each 
observation. This paper also performs an additive transformation on cash flow 
to control rights (0/C) by subtracting the median ratio of cash flow to control 
rights from each observation. 
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Chapter 5 Descriptive Statistics 
This section is divided into two parts. In the first part, it reports summary 
statistics on some key variables used in the subsequent regression analysis. 
Table 6 summarizes the construction of variables. Table 7 shows the mean and 
standard deviation of all relevant variables. In the second part, two limitations 
associated with the construction of variables are outlined. 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
5.1.1 Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
Table 8A presents some basic statistics on cumulative abnormal returns 
for each of the four partitions of the sample: concurrent earnings increase, 
positive dividend surprise (CE+UD+); concurrent earnings increase, negative 
dividend surprise (CE+UD-); concurrent earnings decrease, positive dividend 
surprise (CE-UD+); concurrent earnings decrease, negative dividend surprise 
(CE-UD-). The average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for (CE+UD+) 
and (CE-UD-) are both significantly different from zero. Table 8B shows the 
pattern of average cumulative abnormal returns over the event window. 
5.1.2 Stockholdings (major) 
The average percentage shareholding by the largest shareholder is 48.59%, 
with a standard deviation of 15.45. This indicates that the ownership is highly 
concentrated in Hong Kong, with a single shareholder or family group which 
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has the majority ownership in most of the listed companies in Hong Kong. 
Table 9A shows percentage shareholdings by type of the largest shareholder, 
classified by individuals, corporations and state. The largest shareholder is 
"individual" according for 164 of 228 observations (71.93%), followed by 
"corporations" with 50 observations (21.93%). The category "state" accounts 
for 14 observations (6.14%), it in which are mostly PRC state-owned 
enterprises or corporations that are controlled by municipal governments in 
mainland China. The average percentage shareholdings by each type of the 
largest shareholder is the smallest for individuals (46.80 %), compared with 
51.87% for corporations and 59.47% for the state respectively. 
5.1.3 Ratio of Cash Flow to Control Rights (O/C) 
The mean ratio of cash flow to control rights of the largest shareholder is 
0.921. It implies that on average, 1% of cash flow rights "buy" 1.086 % of 
control rights for the largest shareholder. Table 9B shows that the mean ratio of 
cash flow to control rights by each type of the largest shareholder is the lowest 
for individuals (0.911). Earlier literature of Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang 
(2002) investigated the differences in the concentration of cash flow and 
control rights across the nine East Asian countries including Hong Kong. They 
found that the mean ratio of cash flow to control rights of 330 corporations in 
Hong Kong is 0.882. Compared with their empirical findings, the O/C ratio 
that is obtained in this paper is rather high. This may be due to the fact that the 
number of firms in our sample is much smaller (136 firms, 228 observations) 
and there are relatively fewer firms that are controlled through pyramids and 
other controlled-enhanced mechanisms. 
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5.2 Limitations 
There are two limitations that are associated with the construction of 
variables. 
Firstly, the change in concurrent earnings (CE) is measured as announced 
change in earnings divided by the market value of firm. With the same reason 
for the announcements of dividend changes, only the unexpected change in 
earnings should affect stock prices in the event studies. Thus, the announced 
change in earnings is proxy for the earning surprise in this paper. This proxy to 
a certain extent is unrealistic, as it assumes that investors expect earnings will 
remain the same as in the previous year. 
Secondly, the variables of ownership structure are constructed by using 
the latest ownership data in the day of data collection. Ideally, the variables of 
ownership structures should be constructed by using the ownership data that is 
available before dividend announcements. However, as Wardleycards are 
updated weekly, it is difficult to check the ownership data exactly before the 
date of dividend declaration. 
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Chapter 6 Empirical Analysis 
In this paper, the cross-sectional ordinary least square regression (OLS) is 
the major tool to examine model (1), (4)，(6) as discussed above. Appendix C 
shows the complete dataset. This section consists of two parts. In the first part, 
the results of the hypothesized regression models are presented. In the second 
part, in order to check the robustness of the findings, the sensitivity tests are 
conducted and results are reported. 
6.1 Regression Results 
6.1.1 Stock Price Reaction to Dividend Change Announcements 
Table 10 shows the estimation results of model (1) with White 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The estimated coefficient for 
dividend surprises is positive and statistically significant (p-value = 0.034). 
This result suggests that dividend surprises have information content and can 
induce abnormal stock returns. This is consistent with the claim that favorable 
(unfavorable) dividend surprises are associated with increases (decreases) in 
stock prices in agency cost hypothesis. The coefficient for change in concurrent 
earning is also statistically significant (p-value = 0.036). 
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6.1.2 Effects of Ownership Structure on Stock Price Reaction 
Table 11 shows the estimation results of model (4) with White 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The estimated coefficient for the 
interaction term major*UD is positive and statistically significant (p-value = 
0.068), suggesting that the higher the percentage shareholdings held by the 
largest shareholder, the greater the marginal effect of unexpected dividend 
changes on stock prices. Specifically, for every 1 percent that the shareholdings 
by the largest shareholder increase, the marginal effect of unexpected dividend 
changes on stock prices increase by 0.117 percent. This result is consistent with 
agency cost hypothesis that the larger the stockholdings of the controlling 
shareholder, the larger the potential agency conflicts and so the more 
informative are dividend change announcements. In other words, the sensitivity 
of stock price reaction to unexpected dividend changes is positively related to 
the percentage shareholdings by the largest shareholder. 
The estimated coefficient for the interaction term 0/C*UD is negative and 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.057), indicating that the larger the 
divergence between the cash flow to control rights (lower 0/C ratio) of the 
largest shareholder, the larger the marginal effect of unexpected dividend 
changes on stock prices. It is consistent with agency cost hypothesis, saying 
that the larger the divergence between the cash flow and control rights, the 
larger the potential agency conflicts and so the more informative are dividend 
change announcements. To put it another way, the sensitivity of stock price 
reaction to unexpected dividend changes is positively related to the degree of 
divergence between the cash flow and the control rights of the largest 
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shareholder. 
As variables “major，，and "0/C" are centered in the regression, the 
coefficient al represents the regression of UD on CAR where major equals its 
mean (major = 48.59 percent) and 0/C equals its median (0/C = 1). We can 
interpret this as the "average" of the marginal effect of unexpected dividend 
changes on stock prices and the coefficient al is statistical significant (p-value 
二 0.041). Also, coefficient for CE is positive and but is statistical insignificant. 
To summarize, these results support the agency cost hypothesis. Firms 
with potentially large agency conflicts would experience larger stock price 
reactions than firms with small agency conflicts. We can also conclude that the 
unexpected dividend change is the most informative if the percentage 
shareholdings by the largest shareholder is large and the 0/C ratio is small. 
This is because in this situation, the potential large-small shareholder conflict 
associated with the firm is the largest. 
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6.1.3 Non-Linear Ownership Effects on Stock Price Reaction 
Table 12 shows the results of model (6) with White heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors. Coefficient for UD (p-value = 0.000)，major*UD 
(p-value = 0.043) and 0/C*UD (p-value = 0.038) have exactly the same signs 
as in model (4), and are all statistically significant. The coefficient for change 
in concurrent earning is also statistically significant (p-value = 0.052). 
The non-linear ownership effects on stock price reaction to dividend 
changes, which are reflected by coefficient a4, are negative and statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.030). The negative coefficient for the interaction term 
major^*lJD implies that the influence of major has an inverted-U shape: the 
marginal effect of dividend changes on stock prices first increases with the 
percentage shareholdings by the largest shareholder and reaches a maximum at 
61.98 percent (centered major = 13.39). Thereafter, the marginal effect of 
dividend changes on stock prices starts to fall. Also, it can be noted that the 
significance level of all explanatory variables (and so the adjusted R-square) 
increases pronouncedly in model (6), as compared with in model (4). It implies 
that the non-linear ownership effect on stock price reaction to unexpected 
dividend changes is strongly supported by evidence. 
The non-linear ownership effects on stock price reaction to unexpected 
dividend changes can be explained as follows. Initially a rise in percentage 
ownership implies the higher ability for the largest shareholder to extract 
private benefit from minority shareholder through his/her increased control of 
the firm. By this reasoning, the potential large-small shareholder conflict is 
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more severe and the marginal effect of dividend changes on stock prices 
increases. However, after the percentage shareholdings reach a certain high 
level, the entrenchment effect of the largest shareholder diminishes and 
incentive effect starts to dominate the entrenchment effect. It is the case that if 
the controlling stakes of the largest shareholder are substantially large, he/she 
would also suffer from a great loss of wealth associated with the firm when 
he/she runs the firm improperly. Hence, the potential large-small shareholders 
conflict would be less severe and the marginal effect of dividend changes on 
stock price starts to decline. This result is consistent with the previous findings 
of Morck et al. (1988), which states the nonlinearity relationship between 
management ownership concentration and firm valuation. 
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6.2 Sensitivity Tests 
A particular concern for this study is that the unexpected dividend 
changes (UD) are first estimated in a dividend expectations model and the 
two-step approach may produce estimates that lead to incorrect inference. 
Sensitivity tests are performed to re-estimate the dividend expectations model 
and calculate the correct second-step covariance matrix following 
Murphy-Topel (1985) procedure. In general, the results corroborate the 
findings reported in Tables 10-12. 
6.2.1 Two-Step Estimation Problem 
In this paper, the dividend expectations model is first estimated by OLS. 
The residuals from a dividend expectations model are then used as proxies for 
dividend surprises (UD) in the regression models (1), (4), (6) that are also 
estimated by OLS. In other words, the second stage involves estimating a 
model containing generated regressors. The econometric implications of the 
so-called generated regressor problem have been studied by many researchers. 
As Pagan (1984) suggested, while this two-step approach does not affect 
consistency, it may bias the second-step covariance matrix and so the estimated 
standard error. Empirical researchers generally tackle this problem by 
proposing two different procedures. One could estimate the first and second 
step models jointly by using full information maximum likelihood (FIML). 
Alternatively, one could calculate the correct asymptotic covariance matrix for 
the two-step estimation procedure. 
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As Greene (2000) suggested, there are at least two reasons that FIML may 
be less attractive than the implementation of two-step estimation with corrected 
covariance matrix. First, it may be difficult to derive the proper joint 
distribution for the econometric models. Second, FIML estimation is 
computationally demanding. Based on these ideas, this paper continues to rely 
upon the two-step procedure and calculate the correct covariance matrix in the 
second step following the suggestions by Murphy and Topel (1985). 
6.2.2 Regression Results With Corrected Covariance Matrix 
In order to accomplish the correction of covariance matrix in the second 
step, the dividend expectations model is re-estimated (pooling both the interim 
and final dividend changes) and the results are shown in Table 13. The 
residuals from a dividend expectations model are then put as the generated 
regressors in the second step OLS regression model and the regression results 
with corrected covariance matrix are reported in Table 14. 
Table 14 shows the regression results of model (1)，（4), (6) that are 
estimated with and without the Murphy-Topel (1985) procedure to provide an 
estimate of the bias in the t statistics when the correct procedure is not carried 
out. Unambiguously, the uncorrected two-step estimation procedure 
overestimates the t-ratios of the second-step estimates. However, none of the 
basic conclusions would have been altered as a result of this upward bias. In all 
of the models, the significance level of the various explanatory variables is 
identical under both estimation procedures. 
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To summarize, the implementation of two-step estimation with corrected 
covariance matrix gives similar regression results. The adjusted t-ratios of the 
second-step estimates decline slightly. These results suggest that the potential 
bias in estimating standard errors under two-step estimation approach has not 
affected the reliability of the regression results. 
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Chapter 7 Discussion and Relation to Prior Literature 
As there are a number of studies investigating the expropriation of 
minority shareholders in the recent years, it is useful to consider how the 
results can be related to previous research. In fact, the results to some degree 
provide support for the substitution hypothesis (LLSV. 2000) and the notion of 
market force. 
This paper has found evidence that the capital market attaches a higher 
value to the firms that increase their dividends, since the increase in dividends 
is the commitment of the controlling shareholder not to use the retained 
earnings at their discretion. In contrast, the market attaches a lower value to the 
firms that reduce their dividends, as the reduction in dividends potentially 
implies the higher risk of expropriation by the controlling shareholders. 
Therefore, in order to sustain their firm's valuation and future access to capital, 
management will refrain from expropriation of minority shareholders. 
This argument is especially applicable to families that are frequently 
regarded as repositories for reputation. As suggested by Bebchuk et al (1998), 
since family pyramids tend to grow gradually through the generation of 
internal capital and the issuance of minority stock, family controllers may then 
have the incentive to pre-commit and pay out more dividends to assure 
continued growth for the benefit of their offspring. 
The results of this paper are also in line with the earlier research of Faccoi, 
Lang and Young (2001). They document that substitution hypothesis is 
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supportive in Western European, where firms are tightly affiliated to a business 
group. They argue that this is probably because the market participants are alert 
to potential expropriation by firms that are tightly affiliated to a business group. 
As a result, they would demand higher dividend payouts. The same logic can 
be used to explain the findings in this paper. Compared with other East Asian 
countries like Indonesia and Thailand, the capital market in Hong Kong is 
more transparent and mature. The market participants in Hong Kong are alert 
to potential expropriation by the controlling shareholders. As a result, by 
attaching a higher (lower) market value for the firms that increase (decrease) 
dividends, market force is effective in limiting the expropriation by the 
controlling shareholders. 
In other words, the results provide evidence that the effectiveness of the 
market forces in fact, critically depends on whether the capital market is 
transparent or not. As indicated by the Coase Theorem (1961), it is sufficient to 
have a well-regulated, transparent financial market in order to ensure the 
market force to work well. Hence, the findings highlight the importance of 
further reforms and the increased transparency of capital market in Hong Kong. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
In the neo-classical world of MM (1961), dividend policy is irrelevant to 
firm value. However, frictionless world does not exist in reality and a host of 
theories have been put forward to explain why dividends do matter. This paper 
provides support for one predominant explanation of information content of 
dividends一agency cost theory of dividends. By using data from a sample of 
228 dividend change announcements of Hong Kong-listed firms over the 
period 2001-2002，the cross-sectional regression results show that there is (I) a 
positive association between stock price reaction and dividend change 
announcements; and (II) firms with potentially large agency conflicts before 
announcements would experience larger stock price reactions than do firms 
with small agency conflicts. Specifically, by using shareholdings and the 
degree of divergence between the cash flow and control rights of the largest 
shareholder as the proxies for the potential agency conflicts of firm, this paper 
has found a positive association between the potential large-small shareholders 
conflict and the magnitude of stock price reaction to unexpected dividend 
changes. Overall, the empirical results provide evidence that pro-rata dividends 
do play a critical role in mitigating agency conflicts by removing corporate 
wealth from insider control in Hong Kong. 
The results have also shed light on the issue of expropriation of minority 
shareholders in Hong Kong. This paper shows the effects of market forces in 
limiting expropriation by attaching a higher (lower) market value for the firms 
that increase (decrease) dividends. It implies that market participants in Hong 
Kong are alert to potential expropriation by the controlling shareholder. This 
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result also highlights the importance of further reforms and the increased 
transparency of capital markets in order to ensure that market forces work well. 
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Table lA 
Number of dividend change announcements by sample selection criteria 
Number of 
Selection criteria dividend 
changes 
Dividend change announcements by firms listed on the SEHK 733 
1. Less dividend changes less than 10 percent (39) 
2. Less special or stock dividends or quarterly dividends (65) 
3. Less dividend omissions and initiations (222) 
4. Less stock splits or stock consolidations (16) 
5. Less firms that coefficient for market index is statistically (140) 
insignificant at the 10 percent level 
6. Less financial firms (23) 
Total dividend change announcements included in the sample 228 
Table IB 
Number of dividend change announcements by year 
Number of dividend change announcements 
Year Interim Final 
Increase Decrease Increase Decrease 
2001 24 29 37 29 
2002 29 26 24 30 
Total 53 55 61 59 
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Table 2 Definitions of variables used in dividend expectations model 
Variable Pefiiiitioii Source 
dchange is the change in dividends, dchange = [dividend per 
share of current year- dividend per share of previous Web page of 
year]/ stock price (Datastream Datatype = P) 10 days Clearing and 
prior to the dividend announcement. Exchange of 
； H o n g Kong 
stage equals 1 if the firm changes its dividend at the final 
stage and zero if the firm changes the dividend at the 
interim stage. 
logmv is the natural logarithm of the market value 
(Datastream Datatype = MV) 10 days prior to the Datastream 
dividend announcement. International 
— database 
dyield is the dividend yield (Datastream Datatype = dyield) 
10 days prior to the dividend announcement. 
gf-i is the growth in fixed assets as of the last financial 
year prior to the dividend announcement. 
ga-i is the growth in total assets as of the last financial 
year prior to the dividend announcement. 
gc-i is the growth in total cash and cash equivalents as of 
the last financial year prior to the dividend 
announcement. 
gw-i is the growth in working capital as of the last Company's 
financial year prior to the dividend announcement. annual report 
Working capital is calculated as [current assets -
current liabilities]. 
ge-i is the growth in annual earnings as of the last 
financial year prior to the dividend announcement. 
Earnings are defined as the profit before taxation. 
gl-i is the growth in total liabilities as of the last financial 
year prior to the dividend announcement. 
gie is the growth in interim earnings as of the last Company's 
financial year prior to the dividend announcement. interim report 
Earnings are defined as the profit before taxation. 
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Table 3A 
Summary statistics for variables used in interim dividend expectations 
model 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
dchange -.5645236 2.216563 
logmv 3.244809 .7221276 
dyield 6.274074 5.242471 
gf-i .252404 1.213837 
ga-i .1622613 .3815341 
gc-i .36471 1.768718 
gw-i -.7483725 13.41857 
ge-i .078929 1.03148 
gl-i .2475368 1.386744 
Table 3B 
Summary statistics for variables used in final dividend expectations model 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
dchange -.2528173 2.00064 
logmv 3.253618 .7160291 
dyield 4.774917 2.828356 
gf.i .2573244 1.131873 
ga-i .1914533 .3513677 
gc-i .9332823 4.440548 
gw-i 4.09405 39.53278 
ge-i .8074239 4.623695 
gl-i .8035838 6.612749 
gie -.7890965 12.74201 
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Table 4A 
Regression results of interim dividend expectations model 
Interim dividend expectations model 
Independent variable Coefficient t-ratio p-value 
Intercept 3.129358 *** 
(.8920761) ^ 0.001 
logmv -.4414564 * 
(.2308213) ^ 0.059 
dyield -.3484184*** 
(.0313852) -11.10 0.000 
gf-i -.2239062 
(.3482079) -OM 0.522 
ga-i -.9302372 
(.8562561) 0.280 
gc-i .1574705 * 
(.0941508) 0.098 
gw-i .0023764 
(.0108223) ^ 0.827 
ge-i .3462287 ** 
(.1397187) ^ 0.015 
gl-i .1981093 
(.3961478) ^ 0.618 
Dependent variable dchange 
Number of observations 
R-square 0.6125 
Adjusted R-square 0.5812 
Model: dchange 二 a + pilogmv + p2dyield + p3gf-i + p4ga-i + p5gc-i + P6gw-i 
+ p7ge-i + (38gl-i + e 
Definitions and notations of the variables are given in Table 2. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, 1 percent level respectively (two-tailed test). 
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Table 4B 
Regression results of final dividend expectations model 
Final dividend expectations model 
Independent variable Coefficient t-ratio p-value 
Intercept 2.289368** 
(1.037428) ^ 0.029 
logmv -.2462904 
(.2516015) -OM 0.330 
dyield -.3399822 *** 
(.0647363) ^ 0.000 
gf-i .0524897 
(.1968065) ^ 0.790 
ga-i -.7069768 
(.698064) 0.313 
gc-i -.087705 ** 
(.0398385) 0.030 
gw-i .0193826 *** 
(.0045601) ^ Q.OQQ 
ge-i .0122854 
(.0348532) ^ 0.725 
gl-i .0071556 
(.0267108) ^ 0.789 
^ .0111359 
(.0126113) ^ 0.379 
Dependent variable dchange 
Number of observations 
R-square 0.3048 
Adjusted R-square 0.2480 
Model: dchange 二 a + pi logmv + p2dyield + p3gf-i + p4ga-i + p5gc-i + p6gw-i 
+ p7ge-i+p8gl-i + p9gie + e 
Definitions and notations of the variables are given in Table 2. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*，**，*** significant at the 10，5, 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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Table 5A 
Regression results of reduced interim dividend expectations model 
Reduced interim dividend expectations model 










(.0793823) ^ 0.030 
ge-i .3422811** 
(.1377838) ^ 0.015 
Dependent variable dchange 
Number of observations 
R-square 0.6106 
Adjusted R-square 0.5915 
Model: dchange = a + pi logmv + p2dyield + P4ga-i + P5gc-i + p7ge-i + e 
Definitions and notations of the variables are given in Table 2. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*, **, ***significant at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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Table 5B 
Regression results of reduced final dividend expectations model 
Reduced final dividend expectations model 
Independent variable Coefficient t-ratio p-value 
Intercept 1.226181*** 
(.308173) 3 M 0.000 
dyield -.3077419*** 




(.004324) ^ 0.000 
Dependent variable dchange 
Number of observations 120 
R-square 0.2873 
Adjusted R-square 0.2688 
Model: dchange = a + |32dyield + |35gc-i + (36gw-i + e 
Definitions and notations of the variables are given in Table 2. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*, **, ***significant at the 10，5, 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
68 
Table 6 
Definitions of variables used in regression models (1), (4)，(6) 
Variable Defmiti 細 Source 
is the cumulative abnormal return obtained by 
CAR summing the abnormal returns over 11 days, 
day-5 and +5. 
N/A 
is the unexpected dividend changes. It is the 
UD residual from the reduced dividend expectations 
model. 
is the percentage shareholdings by the largest 
major shareholder relative to the total number of shares 
outstanding. If there is a divergence between the 
cash flow and control rights, the variable major is 
then measured as the percentage control rights of Wardleycards 
the largest shareholder. 
is the ratio of ownership rights to control rights 
0/C owned by the largest shareholder. 
is the change in concurrent earnings. CE = 
CE [earnings of current year- earnings of previous Company's 
year]/market value (Datastream Datatype = MV) annual report 
10 days prior the dividend announcement. 
69 
Table 7 
Summary statistics for variables used in regression models (1)，（4)，(6) 
Variable Mean Median Standard Min Max 
Deviation 
CAR .0016546 -.0034234 .0994588 -.2754446 .4417419 
Positive UD 1.260645 .9287180 1.180238 .0501224 6.034481 
Negative UD -.9674729 -.7207827 1.006260 -.0004855 -7.021051 
UP -3.30e-07 -.1431493 1.548334 -7.021051 6.034481 
major 48.58614 51.57 15.44695 7.8 89.16 
0/C .9214618 1 .1991879 .0868755 1 
OT -.0242838 -.0044514 .1746031 -1.404265 .8758001 
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Table 8A 
Basic statistics on average cumulative abnormal returns 
Unexpected Dividend Changes (UD) 
Concurrent 
r • , � � Positive Negative 
Earnings (CE) 
[CAR .0581536 -.0130623 
Increase test-statistics (5.69)*** (-1.015) 
No. observations 63 ^ 
CAR .0060382 -.0352424 
Decrease test-statistics (0.516) (-3.76)*** 
No. observations 36 ^ 
Four partitions of concurrent earnings and dividend surprise: concurrent 
earnings increase, positive dividend surprise (CE+UD+); concurrent earnings 
increase, negative dividend surprise (CE+UD-); concurrent earnings decrease, 
positive dividend surprise (CE-UD+); concurrent earnings decrease, negative 
dividend surprise (CE-UD-). 
***significant at the 1 percent levels (two-tailed test). 
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Table 8B 
The pattern of average cumulative abnormal returns over event window 
Average CAR for four partitions of change in concurrent earnings 
(CE) and unexpected dividend changes (UD) 
0.02 — — ~ 务 ( C E + U D - ) 
-0.02 _5 4 -3 J i — - 1 0 I 2 3 ( C E - U D - ) 
-0.04 
- 0 . 0 6 ^ " " ^ ^ " " " " ^ — — 一 " ^ — — — — 一 
event window 
( C E + U D + ) ( C E + U D - ) ( C E - U D + ) ( C E - U D - ) 
Event window C A R C A R C A R C A R 
-5 0 . 0 0 5 8 1 2 - 0 . 0 0 5 6 5 8 1 0 . 0 0 2 3 1 8 2 0 . 0 0 2 5 3 5 2 
-4 0 . 0 1 3 9 6 7 7 - 0 . 0 0 2 7 6 4 8 0 . 0 0 6 8 3 8 1 - 0 . 0 0 0 2 1 8 2 
-3 0 . 0 2 0 5 1 1 6 - 0 . 0 0 2 2 9 6 9 0 . 0 0 6 7 9 8 9 - 0 . 0 0 0 6 7 3 8 
-2 0 . 0 2 6 4 4 4 1 8 . 2 1 5 E - 0 5 0 . 0 0 5 8 9 9 - 0 . 0 0 2 3 7 2 7 
-1 0 . 0 3 6 5 7 9 5 - 0 . 0 0 8 4 2 0 7 - 0 . 0 0 2 3 5 4 2 - 0 . 0 2 2 2 3 6 1 
0 0 . 0 5 0 0 0 9 3 0 . 0 0 3 3 7 2 1 - 0 . 0 0 6 2 4 1 6 - 0 . 0 3 4 9 8 4 6 
1 0 . 0 5 0 8 1 6 1 - 0 . 0 0 1 3 6 6 6 - 0 . 0 0 6 6 7 4 8 - 0 . 0 3 7 5 2 4 1 
2 0 . 0 5 8 0 5 5 9 - 0 . 0 0 2 4 0 5 6 - 0 . 0 0 6 0 5 4 8 - 0 . 0 3 9 3 5 2 4 
3 0 . 0 5 7 0 2 0 3 - 0 . 0 0 8 6 6 0 6 0 . 0 0 1 6 7 8 9 - 0 . 0 3 9 5 7 0 5 
4 0 . 0 5 9 2 9 1 7 - 0 . 0 0 9 3 8 3 2 - 0 . 0 0 2 2 5 4 4 - 0 . 0 3 4 6 9 5 6 
5 0 . 0 5 8 1 5 3 6 - 0 . 0 1 3 0 6 2 4 0 . 0 0 6 0 3 8 3 - 0 . 0 3 5 2 4 2 5 
Four partitions of concurrent earnings and dividend surprise: concurrent 
earnings increase, positive dividend surprise (CE+UD+); concurrent earnings 
increase, negative dividend surprise (CE+UD-); concurrent earnings decrease, 
positive dividend surprise (CE-UD+); concurrent earnings decrease, negative 
dividend surprise (CE-UD-) 
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Table 9A 
Number of observations by largest shareholder categories 
Largest shareholder Number of observations Percentage of observations 
Individuals m 7 1 ^ 
Corporation 50 21.93 
State 14 6.140 
Total 228 100 
Table 9B 
Summary statistics on ownership structure by largest shareholder 
categories 
Individuals Mean Standard deviation A^ Max 
Major 46.79524 15.94296 1 丄 79.6 
0/C 0.91136 0.199139 1 
Corporation Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Major 51.8708 12.58737 23.34 89.16 
0/C 0.93982 0.220968 0.087 1 
State Mean Standard deviation Max 
Major 59.465 10.53379 39.45 76.14 
0/C 1 0 1 1 — 
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Table 10 
Regression results of model (1) 
Model (1) 
Independent variable Coefficient t-ratio p-value 
Intercept .0033413 
(.0064268) 0.520 .60364 
UD .0178994 ** 
(.0083953) 2.132 .03408 
CE .0694597 ** 
(.033056) .03673 
Dependent variable CAR 
Number of observations 228 
R-square 0.1011 
Adjusted R-square 0.0931 
Model: CAR = 0 + blUD + b2CE + u 
Definitions and notations of the variables are given in Table 6. 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
*, **, ***significant at the 10，5, 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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Table 10 
Regression results of model (1) 
Model (1) 
Independent variable Coefficient t-ratio p-value 
Intercept -.0021858 
(.0060420) -0.362 .71787 
UD .0145321** 
(.0070749) 2.054 .04114 
major*UD .0011728 * 
(.00064070) .06850 
0/C*lJD -.0489529* 
(.025620) -1.911 .05732 
CE .0526947 
(.032071) .10178 
Dependent variable CAR 
Number of observations 
R-square 0.1708 
Adjusted R-square 0.1560 
Model: CAR = e + alUD + a2major*UD + a30/C*UD + b2CE + u 
Definitions and notations of the variables are given in Table 6. 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
*, **，***significant at the 10，5, 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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Table 10 
Regression results of model (1) 
Model (1) 
Independent variable Coefficient t-ratio p-value 
Intercept -.002705 
(.0059705) ^ .65094 
UD .0226681 *** 
(.0053089) 4.270 .00003 
major*UD .0009589 ** 
(.00047244) 2.030 .04359 
0/C*UD -.0499755 ** 
(.024045) -2.078 .03882 
major2*UD -.0000358 ** 
(.00001646) -2.174 .03073 
CE .0565612* 
(.028976) .05219 
Dependent variable CAR 
Number of observations 
R-square 0.1948 
Adjusted R-square 0.1767 
Model: CAR = 6 + alUD + a2major*UD + a30/C*UD + a4major^*UD + 
b2CE + u 
Definitions and notations of the variables are given in Table 6. 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
* ** *** significant at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tail test). 
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Table 13 
Regression results of dividend expectations model (interim and final 
dividend) 
Dividend expectations model 




(.16942) -1.571 .11754 
dyield -0.33858*** 
(.029696) -11.402 .00000 
gf-i -0.12471 
(.13318) -0.936 .35010 
ga-i -0.22525 
(.44749) -0.503 .61521 
gc-i -0.050996 





gl_i - 0 . 0 0 2 0 1 8 2 
(.024007) -0.084 .93308 
stage -0.22227 
(.22115) -1.005 .31598 
Dependent variable dchange 
Number of observations 228 
R-square 0.4329 
Adjusted R-square 0.4095 
Model: dchange 二 a + pi logmv + p2dyield + P3gf-i + p4ga-i + pSgc-i + p6gw-i 
+ p7ge-i + p8gl-i + |39stage + e 
Definitions and notations of the variables are given in Table 2. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*，**, ***significant at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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Table 14 
Regression results of models (1)，(4)，(6) with corrected covariance matrix 
Model (1): CAR = 9 + alUD + b2CE + u 
Independent variable Coefficient Original t Corrected t 
Intercept .0033372 0.520 0.498 
UP .017733 2.129** 2.117** 
CE .069300 2.055** 2.049** 
Adjusted R-square 0.0954 
Model (4): CAR = 0 + alUD + a2major*UD + a30/C*UD + b2CE + u 
Independent variable Coefficient Original t Corrected t 
Intercept -.0026727 -0.432 -0.420 
UD .015115 2.136** 2 . 1 0 7 * * ~ 
major*UC .0011806 1.837* 1.781* 
0/C*UD -.046862 -1.835* -1.804* 
CE .051356 1.657 1.651 
Adjusted R-square 0.1618 
Model (6): CAR二e+alUD+a2major*UD+a30/C*UD+a4major2*UD+b2CE +u 
Independent variable Coefficient Original t Corrected t 
Intercept -.0036473 -0.599 -0.560 
^ .023101 4.071*** 4.055*** 
major*UD .0009973 2.145** 2.034** _ 
0/C*UD -.049915 -2.150** -2.093** 
major2*UD -.0000359 -2.159** -2.087** 
CE .054641 1.946* 1.931* 
Adjusted R-square 0.1850 
Corrected t-ratios are adjusted following Murphy and Topel (1985) procedure. 
Let V and V* be the estimated and corrected covariance matrix, respectively. 
Murphy and Topel (1985) show that F* = F ( l + A ^ a i^ / a 2') , where A is the 
coefficient estimate of the generated regressor from the second-step regression, 
a and a are the estimated error variances from the first and second-step 
models, respectively. The correction is assumed that the error terms of the first 
and second step regressions are independent. Significance levels are based on 
White-adjusted t-statistics. *, **，*** significant at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels, 
respectively (two-tailed test). 
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Appendix Al 
Interim dividend increase announcements in sampling period 2001 
Previous Declaration Financial 
Company Name Type This Year 
^ ^ Year Date Year 
ASM PACIFIC C 30 cents 36 cents 23/7/2001 31/12/2001 
BRIGHT INTL I 7 cents 8 cents 28/8/2001 31/12/2001 
BRILLIANCE CHINA S 0.3 cent 0.4 cent 5/9/2001 31/12/2001 
CHINA RARE EARTH I 1 cent 2 cents 10/9/2001 31/12/2001 
CHINA RES ENTREP C 6 cents 8 cents 18/9/2001 31/12/2001 
CHINA TRAVEL INTL S 1 cent 5 cents 21/8/2001 31/12/2001 
COFCO INTL S 3 cents 4 cents 25/9/2001 31/12/2001 
COSCO PACIFIC C 8.2 cents 9.5 cents 6/9/2001 31/12/2001 
COSLIGHT TECH I 2 cents 2.6 cents 24/9/2001 31/12/2001 
ELEC & ELTEK INTL C 2 cents 3 cents 6/2/2001 30/6/2001 
ESPRIT HOLDINGS I 3.8 cents 4.8 cents 1/3/2001 30/6/2001 
FOUNTAIN SET I 3.5 cents 4.5 cents 18/5/2001 31/8/2001 
GUOCO GROUP C 15 cents 20 cents 16/3/2001 30/6/2001 
HANG LUNG PROP I 10 cents 11 cents 2/3/2001 30/6/2001 
IMI GLOBAL I 0.6 cent 0.7 cent 28/11/2001 31/3/2002 
KINYATHDG I 2.5 cents 3 cents 14/12/2001 31/3/2002 
FCOWLOONMTRBUS I 33 cents 40 cents 13/9/2001 31/12/2001 
LEGEND GROUP C 1.1 cents 1.5 cents 7/11/2001 31/3/2002 
LI & FUNG I 7 cents 8 cents 20/8/2001 31/12/2001 
SHANGHAI INDL C 11 cents 14 cents 3/9/2001 31/12/2001 
TECHTRONICINDS I 4 cents 4.5 cents 3/9/2001 31/12/2001 
TEXWINCAHDG I 6 cents 8 cents 18/12/2001 31/3/2002 
TIANJIN DEVELOP S 3.5 cents 4 cents 12/9/2001 31/12/2001 
TPV TECHNOLOGY I 1.638 cents 2.028 cents 6/9/2001 31/12/2001 
Type: type of the largest shareholder, classified by individuals (I), corporation 
(C) and state (S). 
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Appendix A2 
Interim dividend decrease announcements in sampling period 2001 
Previous Declaration Financial 
Company Name Type This Year 
Year Date Year 
AUTOMATED SYS I 3 cents 2 cents 8/11/2001 31/3/2002 
CATHAY PACIFIC I 20 cents 12.5 cents 8/8/2001 31/12/2001 
CHEVALIER INTL I 2.5 cents 2 cents 18/12/2001 31/3/2002 
CHINA EVERBRIGHT C 5 cents 3.6 cents 4/9/2001 31/12/2001 
CHINA-HK PHOTO I 4 cents 2.5 cents 11/12/2001 31/3/2002 
CHOW SANG SANG I 6 cents 3 cents 30/8/2001 31/12/2001 
CHUNWOHDG I 1 cent 0.5 cent 19/12/2001 31/3/2002 
DAIWA ASSOCIATE I 5 cents 2 cents 10/12/2001 31/3/2002 
GLORIOUS SUN I 3.3 cents 2.7 cents 18/12/2001 31/3/2002 
GREAT EAGLE HDG I 10 cents 7 cents 11/9/2001 31/12/2001 
KWAHCONMATERIALS I 2.5 cents 1.5 cents 18/9/2001 31/12/2001 
KINGBOARD CHEMICALS I 4 cents 3.5 cents 6/12/2001 31/3/2002 
KOWLOON CHUNG B U S I 1 cent 0.5 cent 17/12/2001 31/3/2002 
LIU CHONG KING INV I 14 cents 10 cents 16/8/2001 31/12/2001 
LUNGKEEBERHDG I 6 cents 3 cents 7/12/2001 31/3/2002 
M I D L A N D REALITY I 1 cent 0.5 cent 17/9/2001 31/12/2001 
MIRABELLINTL I 2.8 cents 1.5 cents 19/11/2001 31/3/2002 
MOULIN INTL I 2.4 cents 1.4 cents 13/12/2001 31/3/2002 
ORIENT POWER I 1 cent 0.5 cent 6/9/2001 31/12/2001 
O R I E N T A L PRESS GP I 5 cents 3 cents 13/12/2001 31/3/2002 
O R I E N T A L WATCH I 3 cents 2.5 cents 18/12/2001 31/3/2002 
R I S I N G DEVEL HOLDING I 1.2 cents 1 cent 11/12/2001 31/3/2002 
ROAD KING INFRA C 19 cents 7 cents 20/7/2001 31/12/2001 
SHUI ON CONANDMATS I 60 cents 15 cents 27/11/2001 31/3/2002 
SINO LAND I 5 cents 2 cents 20/3/2001 30/6/2001 
TCC INTL I 3 cents 2 cents 26/9/2001 31/12/2001 
TONIC IND I 1 cents 0.5 cent 13/12/2001 31/3/2002 
VAN SHUNG CHONG I 3 cents 1.8 cents 21/12/2001 31/3/2002 
VARITRONIX INTL I 15 cents 6.5 cents 24/9/2001 31/12/2001 
Type: type of the largest shareholder, classified by individuals (I), corporation 
(C) and state (S). 
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Appendix A2 
Interim dividend decrease announcements in sampling period 2001 
Previous Declaration Financial 
Company Name Type This Year 
^ ^ Year Date Year 
ALCO HOLDINGS I 1.5 cents 2 cents 5/12/2002 31/3/2003 
CAFE DE CORAL I 4.4 cents 6.4 cents 16/12/2002 31/3/2003 
CATHAY PACIFIC I 12.5 cents 16 cents 7/8/2002 31/12/2002 
CHAMPION TECH C 0.0625 cent 1.6 cents 26/3/2002 30/6/2002 
CHINA RES ENTREP C 8 cents 9 cents 4/9/2002 31/12/2002 
CHUN WO I 0.5 cent 0.75 cent 18/12/2002 31/3/2003 
CITIC PACIFIC C 20 cents 30 cents 26/8/2002 31/12/2002 
CNOOC LTD S 10 cents 11 cents 23/8/2002 31/12/2002 
COSCO PACIFIC C 9.5 cents 11 cents 5/9/2002 31/12/2002 
DENWAY MOTORS L T D C 2 cents 3 cents 18/9/2002 31/12/2002 
ESPRIT HOLDINGS I 4.8 cents 6 cents 7/2/2002 30/6/2002 
HOPEWELL HDG I 5 cents 6 cents 4/3/2002 30/6/2002 
JOHNSON ELECTRIC HDG I 3 cents 4 cents 10/12/2002 31/3/2003 
KINGBOARD CHEMICALS I 3.5 cents 4 cents 28/11/2002 31/3/2003 
KOWLOONMTRBUS I 40 cents 45 cents 12/9/2002 31/12/2002 
KWOON CHUNG BUS I 0.5 cent 1 cent 20/12/2002 31/3/2003 
LEGEND GP C 1.5 cents 1.8 cents 12/11/2002 31/3/2003 
LUNGKEEBERHDG I 3 cents 5 cents 13/12/2002 31/3/2003 
MOULIN INTL I 1.4 cents 5.6 cents 18/12/2002 31/3/2003 
ROAD KING INFRA C 7 cents 16 cents 22/7/2002 31/12/2002 
SHUN TAK HOLDING I 2 cents 3.5 cents 23/9/2002 31/12/2002 
SW KINGWAY CAPITAL I 1 cent 1.1 cents 6/3/2002 30/6/2002 
SWIRE PACIFIC A I 36 cents 40 cents 8/8/2002 31/12/2002 
S W I R E PACIFIC B I 7.2 cents 8 cents 8/8/2002 31/12/2002 
TECHTRONICINDS I 4.5 cents 6 cents 8/8/2002 31/12/2002 
TEXWINCAHDG I 8 cents 11 cents 18/12/2002 31/3/2003 
TRULY INTL I 4 cents 5 cents 23/8/2002 31/12/2002 
WING ON COINTL C 4 cents 17 cents 12/9/2002 31/12/2002 
YIP'S CHEMICAL I 2.5 cents 4 cents 13/11/2002 31/3/2003 
Type: type of the largest shareholder, classified by individuals (I), corporation 
(C) and state (S). 
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Appendix Al 
Interim dividend increase announcements in sampling period 2001 
Previous Declaration Financial 
Company Name Type This Year 
^ ^ � Year Date Year 
AUTOMETED SYSTEMS I 2 cents 1.6 cents 11/11/2002 31/3/2003 
BRIGHT INTL GP I 8 cents 6 cents 22/8/2002 31/12/2002 
CARRY WEALTH HDG I 6 cents 2.8 cents 22/8/2002 31/12/2002 
CHEVALERINTL I 2 cents 1.5 cents 16/12/2002 31/3/2003 
CHINA RARE EARTH I 2 cents 1 cent 19/9/2002 31/12/2002 
COFCO INTL S 4 cents 3 cents 28/8/2002 31/12/2002 
DAIWA ASSOCIATE I 2 cents 1.5 cents 28/11/2002 31/3/2003 
ELECT &ELTEK INTL C 3 cents 1 cent 27/2/2002 30/6/2002 
GOLDLIONHDG I 1.5 cents 1 cent 17/9/2002 31/12/2002 
GREAT EAGLE HDG I 7 cents 5 cents 12/9/2002 31/12/2002 
HENDERSON LD DEVE I 55 cents 35 cents 20/3/2002 30/6/2002 
HENGAN INTL GP I 10 cents 8 cents 3/9/2002 31/12/2002 
KWAHCONMATERIALS I 1.5 cents 1 cent 18/9/2002 31/12/2002 
K E R R Y PROPERTIES C 20 cents 18 cents 12/8/2002 31/12/2002 
KINYATHDG I 3 cents 2.5 cents 9/12/2002 31/3/2003 
LUKFOOKHDG I 2.5 cents 2 cents 18/12/2002 31/3/2003 
LUKSINDL I 8 cents 4 cents 24/9/2002 31/12/2002 
O R I E N T A L WATCH I 2.5 cents 2 cents 18/12/2002 31/3/2003 
PERFECTECH INTL I 2 cents 1 cent 18/9/2002 31/12/2002 
SHAW BROTHERS HK I 10 cents 5 cents 4/12/2002 31/3/2003 
S K Y W O R L D DIGITAL I 5 cents 0.5 cent 17/12/2002 31/3/2003 
TAI SANG LAND DEVE I 9 cents 6 cents 6/9/2002 31/12/2002 
TCC INTL I 2 cents 1.5 cents 24/9/2002 31/12/2002 
TIANJINDEVE S 4 cents 3.3 cents 18/9/2002 31/12/2002 
UNITED PACIFIC INDS C 8 cents 4 cents 16/12/2002 31/3/2003 
VARITRONIX INTL I 6.5 cents 4.4 cents 22/8/2002 31/12/2002 
Type: type of the largest shareholder, classified by individuals (I), corporation 
(C) and state (S). 
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Appendix A2 
Interim dividend decrease announcements in sampling period 2001 
Previous Declaration Financial 
Company Name Type This year 
year date year 
ARTS OPTICAL INTL I 3.8 cents 7 cents 20/4/2001 31/12/2000 
ASM PACIFIC C 28 cents 85 cents 12/2/2001 31/12/2000 
AUTOMATED SYSTEM I 2 cents 3 cents 11/5/2001 31/3/2001 
BRILLIANCE CHINA S 0.21 cent 0.5 cent 26/4/2001 31/12/2000 
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS I 27 cents 45 cents 7/3/2001 31/12/2000 
CHENHSONG I 2 cents 6 cents 17/7/2001 31/3/2001 
CHEUNG KONG INFRA I 29 cents 40 cents 15/3/2001 31/12/2000 
CHINA EVERBRIGHT C 8 cents 10 cents 30/3/2001 31/12/2000 
CHINA MRCH C 7 cents 8 cents 19/4/2001 31/12/2000 
CHINA RARE EARTH I 2 cents 3 cents 28/3/2001 31/12/2000 
CHINA RES ENTREP C 9 cents 15 cents 11/4/2001 31/12/2000 
CHUNG TAI PRINT I 4 cents 6 cents 23/7/2001 31/3/2001 
CITIC PACIFIC C 55 cents 65 cents 20/3/2001 31/12/2000 
ELEGANCE INTL I 6.5 cents 7.5 cents 20/7/2001 31/3/2001 
FOUNTAIN SET I 3.5 cents 5.5 cents 14/12/2001 31/8/2001 
GOLDLION I 2 cents 2.5 cents 12/4/2001 31/12/2000 
G R A N D E I 10 cents 20 cents 26/4/2001 31/12/2000 
HANG LUNG PROP I 26 cents 29 cents 24/9/2001 30/6/2001 
HK AIRCRAFT AND ENG I 30 cents 38 cents 6/3/2001 31/12/2000 
HOPEWELL HDG I 6 cents 7 cents 19/9/2001 30/6/2001 
KOWLOONDEVE I 16 cents 18 cents 9/4/2001 31/12/2000 
KOWLOONMTRBUS I 107 cents 125 cents 15/3/2001 31/12/2000 
LEGEND GP C 1.8 cents 2.4 cents 28/6/2001 31/3/2001 
LI & FUNG I 12.5 cents 18 cents 26/3/2001 31/12/2000 
MIDLAND REALITY I 1.5 cents 2 cents 20/3/2001 31/12/2000 
M I R A M A R INTL & INV I 16 cents 19 cents 29/6/2001 31/3/2001 
PICO FAR EAST I 2.5 cents 3.5 cents 16/2/2001 31/10/2000 
SHANGHAI INDL C 22 cents 30 cents 18/4/2001 31/12/2000 
SHENZHEN INV C 3.7 cents 5 cents 24/4/2001 31/12/2000 
Type: type of the largest shareholder, classified by individuals (I), corporation 
(C) and state (S). 
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Appendix A5 
Continued- Final dividend increase announcements in sampling period 
2001 
Previous Declaration Financial 
Company Name Type This year 
year date year 
TELEVISION BROADCAST I 60 cents 75 cents 11/4/2001 31/12/2000 
TEXWINCA I 6 cents 9 cents 18/7/2001 31/3/2001 
TIANJINDEVE S 2 cents 2.5 cents 25/4/2001 31/12/2000 
TPV TECHNOLOGY I 1.482 cents 3.432 cents 19/4/2001 31/12/2000 
TRISTATE I 8 cents 12 cents 9/4/2001 31/12/2000 
TRULY INTL I 4 cents 6 cents 12/4/2001 31/12/2000 
WING ON C 4 cents 9 cents 9/4/2001 31/12/2000 
WONG'S INTL I 6 cents 12 cents 30/3/2001 31/12/2000 
Type: type of the largest shareholder, classified by individuals (I), corporation 
(C) and state (S). 
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Appendix A2 
Interim dividend decrease announcements in sampling period 2001 
Previous Declaration Financial 
Company Name Type This year 
year date year 
APT SATELLITE C 35 cents 15 cents 9/4/2001 31/12/2000 
CHEVALIER INTL I 5 cents 3.5 cents 11/7/2001 31/3/2001 
CHUANG'S CONSORT INTL I 1 cents 0.5 cent 16/7/2001 31/3/2001 
CONTINENTAL HDG I 2 cents 1.5 cents 23/10/2001 30/6/2001 
CROSS-HARBOUR I 10 cents 5 cents 8/3/2001 31/12/2000 
DECCAHDG I 8.6 cents 1.2 cents 26/7/2001 31/3/2001 
FIRST PACIFIC I 2 cents 1 cent 5/3/2001 31/12/2000 
FOUR SEAS EFOOD I 1.5 cents 1 cent 26/7/2001 31/3/2001 
GOLD PEAK INDS I 7 cents 4 cents 14/6/2001 31/3/2001 
GZI TRANSPORT C 5 cents 1 cent 6/4/2001 31/12/2000 
HANG LUNG GP LTD I 40.5 cents 32 cents 24/9/2001 30/6/2001 
HENDERSON CHINA I 10 cents 6 cents 5/10/2001 30/6/2001 
HENDERSON LD DEVE I 100 cents 55 cents 4/10/2001 30/6/2001 
HOPSON DEVE I 5 cents 3 cents 17/4/2001 31/12/2000 
MIRABELLINTL I 5 cents 3.2 cents 11/6/2001 31/3/2001 
MOULIN INTL I 2.6 cents 1 cent 19/7/2001 31/3/2001 
PEGASUS INTL C 3.5 cents 1.5 cents 22/3/2001 31/12/2000 
ROAD KING INFRA C 22 cents 7 cents 28/3/2001 31/12/2000 
SHELL ELECTRIC MNFG I 5 cents 3 cents 18/4/2001 31/12/2000 
SHUN TAK I 5 cents 3 cents 11/4/2001 31/12/2000 
SINO LAND I 5 cents 2 cents 26/9/2001 31/12/2000 
SUN HUNG KAI CO I 4 cents 1 cent 4/4/2001 31/12/2000 
SUN HUNG KAI PROPS I 120 cents 100 cents 28/9/2001 30/6/2001 
TCC INTL I 6 cents 4 cents 2/4/2001 31/12/2000 
TECHNOLOGY VENTURE I 2.8 cents 0.5 cent 26/4/2001 31/12/2000 
TONIC IND I 3.8 cents 0.5 cent 18/7/2001 31/3/2001 
UNIVERSE INTL I 0.6 cent 0.3 cent 23/10/2001 30/6/2001 
YIPS CHEMICAL I 3.5 cents 2.5 cents 28/6/2001 31/3/2001 
ZHONGHUAINTL C 1.6 cents 1.2 cents 24/4/2001 31/12/2000 
Type: type of the largest shareholder, classified by individuals (I), corporation 
(C) and state (S). 
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Appendix Al 
Interim dividend increase announcements in sampling period 2001 
Previous Declaration Financial 
Company Name Type This year 
year date year 
BEIJING ENTERPRISES S 15 cents 18 cents 11/4/2002 31/12/2001 
CHINA MRCH HOLDINGS C 8 cents 9 cents 22/4/2002 31/12/2001 
COFCOINTL S 4 cents 5 cents 8/4/2002 31/12/2001 
COSCO PACIFIC C 11 cents 14 cents 27/3/2002 31/12/2001 
FAR EAST PHARM TECH I 4 cents 4.5 cents 23/10/2002 30/6/2002 
FOUNTAIN SET I 5.5 cents 11 cents 12/12/2002 31/8/2002 
GUOCO C 60 cents 70 cents 18/10/2002 30/6/2002 
GZI TRANSPORT C 1 cent 2.5 cents 17/4/2002 31/12/2001 
HK AIRCRAFT ENGR I 38 cents 42 cents 6/3/2002 31/12/2001 
LEGEND GROUP LTD C 2.4 cents 3.6 cents 23/5/2002 31/3/2002 
LUNG CHEONGINTL I 0.25 cent 0.5 cent 22/7/2002 31/3/2002 
MAINLAND HEAD WEAR I 4.5 cents 5 cents 16/4/2002 31/12/2001 
MOULIN INTL I 1 cent 1.5 cents 31/7/2002 31/3/2002 
MTR CORP “ S 10 cents 28 cents 1/3/2002 31/12/2001 
NGAI KING HONG I 1.5 cents 5 cents 7/10/2002 30/6/2002 
PERFECTECHINDL I 4 cents 4.5 cents 3/4/2002 31/12/2001 
SHANGHAI INDL C 30 cents 34 cents 15/4/2002 31/12/2001 
S H A N G H A I R L ESTATE I 1.2 cents 1.59 cents 25/4/2002 31/12/2001 
SILVER GRANT INTL I 1 cent 2 cents 24/4/2002 31/12/2001 
SINO GOLF I 7 cents 10 cents 5/7/2002 31/3/2002 
STARLITE I 1 cent 2 cents 18/7/2002 31/3/2002 
TECHTRONICINDS I 6 cents 7 cents 24/4/2002 31/12/2001 
WING ON INTL C 9 cents 12 cents 12/4/2002 31/12/2001 
YUE YUEN INDL I 55 cents 60 cents 21/1/2002 30/9/2001 
Type: type of the largest shareholder, classified by individuals (I)，corporation 
(C) and state (S). 
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Appendix A2 
Interim dividend decrease announcements in sampling period 2001 
Previous Declaration Financial 
Company Name Type This year 
year date year 
ALPHA GENERAL I 0.15 cent 0.08 cent 26/7/2002 31/3/2002 
APT SATELLITE C 15 cents 5 cents 8/4/2002 31/12/2001 
ASM PACIFIC TECH C 85 cents 64 cents 8/2/2002 31/12/2001 
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAY I 45 cents 5 cents 6/3/2002 31/12/2001 
CHINA EVERBRIGHT C 10 cents 1.2 cents 28/3/2002 31/12/2001 
CHINA INSURANCE S 4 cents 3.5 cents 26/3/2002 31/12/2001 
CHINA RARE EARTH I 3 cents 2 cents 19/4/2002 31/12/2001 
CHINA RES LAND C 2 cents 1.2 cents 12/4/2002 31/12/2001 
CHUN WO I 1.25 cents 1 cent 15/7/2002 31/3/2002 
CNPCHK S 4 cents 2 cents 22/4/2002 31/12/2001 
ELEC&ELTEKINTL C 2 cents 1.5 cents 18/9/2002 30/6/2002 
GOLD PEAK INDUS I 4 cents 1.5 cents 20/6/2002 31/3/2002 
GOOD FELLOW GP L T D I 1 cent 0.4 cent 25/10/2002 30/6/2002 
GREAT EAGLE I 20 cents 14 cents 13/3/2002 31/12/2001 
HENDERSON LD DEVE I 55 cents 45 cents 3/10/2002 30/6/2002 
HOPSONDEVE I 3 cents 2 cents 18/4/2002 31/12/2001 
KERRY PROPERTIES C 20 cents 12 cents 4/3/2002 31/12/2001 
LERADO GROUP I 8 cents 6 cents 16/4/2002 31/12/2001 
LIU CHONG KING INVES I 21 cents 10 cents 14/3/2002 31/12/2001 
MIDLAND REALTY I 2 cents 1.8 cents 20/3/2002 31/12/2001 
ORIENT OVERSEAS INTL I 23.4 cents 11.7 cents 15/3/2002 31/12/2001 
O R I E N T A L WATCH I 6 cents 4.5 cents 18/7/2002 31/3/2002 
OXFORD PROPS C 25 cents 20 cents 22/5/2002 31/3/2002 
SAFETY GODOWN I 7 cents 6 cents 15/7/2002 31/3/2002 
S H E L L ELECTRIC MNFG I 3 cents 2.5 cents 18/4/2002 31/12/2001 
SINOPEC KANTON C 2 cents 1.5 cents 2/4/2002 31/12/2001 
TAI SANG LAND DEVE I 8 cents 7 cents 28/3/2002 31/12/2001 
TCC INTL I 4 cents 2 cents 25/4/2002 31/12/2001 
TCL INTL C 3.5 cents 3 cents 14/3/2002 31/12/2001 
YANGTZEKIANG GAR I 10 cents 8 cents 16/7/2002 31/3/2002 
Type: type of the largest shareholder, classified by individuals (I), corporation 
(C) and state (S). 
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Appendix B 
Definitions of Datastream Datatype 
Datatype Definition 
Daily stock price - The 'current' price on Datastream's equity programs is the 
(Datatype = P) latest price available from the appropriate market in primary 
units of currency. 
-I t is the previous day's closing price from the default 
exchange and these stored prices are adjusted for subsequent 
capital actions. In Hong Kong, the “nominal，，closing 
exchange price is used. 
Market index - The total market calculations do not include all companies 
(Datatype = in a market. Instead the most important companies by market 
TOMOTK) value are chosen. The precise number of constituents varies 
from market to market, according to the size of the market 
capitalization, and changes to reflect current market 
conditions. 
-Datastream market index of Hong Kong is approximately 
included 130 Hong Kong stocks. 
Dividend yield - The dividend yield expresses the dividend per share as a 
(Datatype 二 DY) percentage of the share price. The underlying dividend is 
calculated according to the same principles as datatype 
DPSC. 
-Dividend per share, current rate (datatype = DPSC) is the 
current aimualised dividend rate. Special or once-off 
dividends are generally excluded. 
Market Value - Market value on Datastream is the share price multiplied by 
(Datatype = MV) the number of ordinary shares in issue. The amount in issue 
is updated whenever new tranches of stock are issued or after 
a capital change. 
-For companies with more than one class of equity capital, 
the market value is expressed according to the individual 
issue. 




Company Name D Date CAR I UD I CE major cmajor 
APT SATELLITE 9-Apr-Ol ~0.094404194 ' -3.18085342 -0.22261645 51.92 3.33 1_ 0 
ARTS OPTICAL INTL 一 20-Apr-01 0.074081875 4.190895419 0.09117275' 55.27 6.68 1_ 0 
ASM PACIFIC - 12-Feb-Ql 0.161299197 4.175995526 0.151761831. 54.11 5.52 I 0 
ASM PACIFIC - 23-Jul-Ol ‘ -0.01060041 1.007972406 -0.06739202' 54.11 5.52 l_ 0 
AUTOMATED SYS 8-Nov-0~ -0.030376'8 -1.17069613 -0.01779687" 7.8 -40.79 0-6526 -0.347 
AUTOMATED SYSTEM “ 11-May-Ol ‘ 0.035764137 -0.28032717 0.015105557' _ 7 . 8 -40.79 0.6526 -0.347 
BRIGHT INTL “ 28-Aug-Ol ‘ 0.219734577 4.222743783 -0.0752 60.55 11.96 l_ 0 
BRILLIANCE CHINA “ 26-Apr-Ol ‘ 0.00261395 -0.93679866 0.085048001 39.45 -9.14 ]_ 0 
BRILLIANCE CHINA “ 5-Sep-Ol ‘ -0.06393826 -0.93803758 -0.013977 39.45 -9.14 ]_ 0 
CATHAY PACIFIC T M I I ^ 0 . 0 8 1 3 6 ^ 1.470055957 0.068025764 46.14 -2.45 0.2896 -0.71 
CATHAY PACIFIC " T X ^ j j ^ -0.02076623 0.050122419 -0.02288716 46.14 -2.45 0.2896 -0.71 
CHENHSONG “ 17-Jul-Ol ‘ 0.07243037 3.292590252 0.102736325 64.86 16.27 1_ 0 
CHEUNG KONG INFRA 15-Mar-m -0.00960125 0.682127755 0.003788534 37.04 -11.55 0-4227 -0.577 
CHEVALIER INTL 一 11-Jul-Ol ‘ -0.03270107 2.08765864 -0.19637664 50.23 1.64 1_ 0 
CHEVALIER INTL “ 18-Dec-Ol ‘ -0.02338806 1.856435791 -0.03286569 50.23 1-64 0 
CHINA EVERBRIGHT “ 30-Mar-01 0.019104553 -0.3622932 0.105353666 55.47 6.88 1. 0 
CHINA EVERBRIGHT 4-Sep-Ol 一0.08769089 -1.4711554 -0.09775812 55.47 6.88 1. 0 
CHINA MRCH 19-Apr-Ol "0.0035699Q6 -0.31797874 0.024393449 53.39 _ L 9. 
CHINA RARE EARTH “ lO-Sep-01 “ -0.18366401 ‘ -0.00048546 0.016049285 51.57 2.98 ]_ 0 
CHINA RARE EARTH 28-Mar-Ol "0.097455705 0.735203744 0.035342308 51.57 2.98 1. 0 
CHINA RES ENTREP 11-Apr-Ol "o.Q37561135 2.956592059 0.005899296 56.6 8.01 1. 0 
CHINA RES ENTREP — 18-Sep-Ol -0.27544457 -0.092797^ -0.00844091 56.6 8.01 1. 0 
CHINA TRAVEL INTL “ 21-Aug-Ol " 0.224473521 2.461893498 0.036705854 59.07 10.48 0 
CHINA-HK PHOTO “ 11-Dec-Ol “ -0.08648204 -1.2918072 -0.05385633 61.2 12.61 1. 0 
CHOW SANG SANG “ 30-Aug-01 “ -0.08963848 -1.05231568 -0.05915541 57.71 9.12 ]_ 0 
CHUANG'S CONSORT INTL 16-Jul-Ol -0.14186851 -1.94000253 -0.92187569 50.19 L 2 
CHUN WO HDG 一 19-Dec-Ol 0.00Q74825~ -1.118437"^ -0.01206929 45.05 -3.54 1. 0 
CHUNG TAI PRINT “ 23-Jul-Ol -0.04104663 “ 3.300282145 ‘ 0.015818584 61.63 13.04 0 
CITIC PACIFIC 20-Mar-01 “ 0.01623797 " 0.669801025 0.00390087 28.8 -19.79 1. 0 
COFCO INTL 25-Sep-Ol 一 0 . 1 7 3 2 7 7 7 8 1911571032 "0022684913 " 6 7 3 3 18.74 1_ 0 
CONTINENTAL HDG “ 23-Qct-Ol " 0.083419943 “ -0.08002827 ‘ -0.21024521 44.24 -4.35 1_ 0 
COSCO PACIFIC - 6-Sep-Ol “ -0.04683285 “ 0.54146684 ‘ 0.001629525 54.87 6.28 1_ 0 
COSLIGHT TECH 一 24-Sep-Ol" 0.000272104 0.797446916 0.016144129 63.03 14.44 1. 0 
CROSS-HARBOUR 8-Mar-Ol -0.045192元-0.45940989 -0.21082054 27.57 -21.02 0.1294 -0.871 
DAIWA ASSOCIATE “ lO-Dec-01 “ -0.11177236 " -1.50050889 ‘ -0.09982359 17.75 -30.84 1. 0 
DECCA HDG “ 26-Jul-Ol “ -0.03895378 “ -1.58383555 “ -0.25319231 56.26 7.67 1_ 0 
ELEC&ELTEKINTL “ 6-Feb-Ol 0.171124945 “ 1.542203941 “ 0.044883951 44.42 -4.17 0 
ELEGANCE INTL “ 20-Jul-01 “ -0.06950243 “ 1.984512345 “ 0.057171949 45.73 -2.86 1_ 0 
ESPRIT HOLDINGS “ 1-Mar-Ol “ 0.047447339 “ -0.61340981 ‘ 0.014243061 42.23 ^ ^ L 2. 
FIRST PACIFIC “ 5-Mar-Ol “ 0.07333476 “ -1.22152709 “ -0.078923 44.52 -4.07 1_ 0 
FOUNTAIN SET “ 18-May-Ol "0.308240667 “ 1.831862303 “ 0.007746393 39.26 -9.33 1_ 0 
FOUNTAIN SET 14-Dec-Ol "0.008902223 "3.555469605 ‘ 0.017578756 39.26 -9.33 1_ 0 
FOUR SEASEFOOD 26-Jul-Ol ~047036125 -0.72078267 0.209160371 33.82 -14.77 1. 0 
GLORIOUS SUN “ 18-Dec-Ol "o.Q21151283 0.986402198 -0.04507722 62.81 14.22 1_ 0 
GOLD PEAK INDS 14-Juii-Ol ~0.07499216 -1.16763487 -0.23997194 25.3 -23.29 1. 0 
GOLDLION “ 12-Apr-Ol —0.030434781 1.956966878 -0.50165714 66.09 17.5 1. 0 
GRANDE 26-Apr-Ol 1 .03683397 1.297634973 -0.25332885 70.48 21.89 1. 0 
GREAT EAGLE HDG 11-Sep-Ol -0.0806387 -0.59515751 -0.01857214 58.86 10.27 1. 0 
GUOCO GROUP 16-Mar-Ol -0.00409017 -0.24510204 -0.09212882 41.88 -6.71 L 2 
GZI TRANSPORT 6-Apr-Ol -0.02555415 -2.47829329 -0.11843571 68.8 20.21 0 
HANG LUNG GP LTD 24-Sep-Ol -0.11250143 -0.21882603 0.006107944 36.01 -12.58 1. 0 
H A I ^ LUNG PROP " T M ^ i ^ 0.0l"529^ 0.595081204 0.008428525 36.01 -12.58 0.6107 -0-389 
H A ^ LUNG PROP 24-Sep-Ol 0 . 0 2 1 8 9 ^ 0.515634719 0.011068405 36.01 -12.58 0.6107 -0-389 
HENDERSON CHINA 5-Oct-Ol "^.04982953 ~ 7 3 3 4 4 2 3 2 "0023238259 64.47 15.88 0.6533 -0.347 
HENDERSON LP DEVE ""“ 4-Oct-Ol -0.08632434 -I.IOSMOO"? -0.05520219 64.47 15.88 l_ 0 
H ^ I R C R A F T AND ENG " T M ^ i ^ -0.07087257 0.368522972 0.145003384 32.47 -16.12 0.2895 
HOPEWELL HDG “ 19-Sep-Ol "-0.03323061 -0.35251191 "0.040297183 25.82 -22.77 0 
HQPSQN DEVE 一 17-Apr-Ol" -0.12540617 -1.44857581 -0.261054石 63.62 15.03 0 
M I GLOBAL “ 28-Nov-Ol 0.025762694 "l.083153345 "0.016143532 57.6 9.01, L 2 
K WAH CONMATERIALS “ 18-Sep-Ol "-0.10365122 "o.566333339 "-0.05846231 65 16.41 0.6725 -0-328 
KIN YAT HDG ~ 14-Dec-0l' 0.129512616 1.750015725 0.049020889 66.62 18.03 ]. 0 
KINGBOARD c h e m i c a l s “ 6-Dec-Ol 0.032247674 "-0.55883988 _-0.01944089 “ 43.86 -4.73 1. 0 
KOWLOON CHUNG BUS 17-Dec-0l| 0.024801887| -1.49166638| -0.10847277丨 31.96| -16.63| l | 0 




Company Name DDate CAR UD CE major cmajor O/C cO/C 
KOWLOON DEVE 9-Apr-oT -0.02330296 1.723234401 0.02121195 72.94 24.35 1_ 0 
KOWLOONMTRBUS 15-Mar-Ol -0.04029256 1.2618832 0.005135478 33.02 H 5 7 0.4488 -0.551 
KOWLOON MTRBUS ~ I 3 ^ p - 0 1 0 . 1 0 4 6 9 2 ^ 1.155063374 0.053424002 33.02 -15.57 0.4488 -0.551 
LEGEND GP 一 28-Jun-Ol ‘ -0.14987598 -0.51606691 -0.00802699' 57.39 L 0 
LEGEND GROUP “ 7-Nov-Ol ‘ -0.13669027 -0.4823111 0.01349639l' 57.39 ^ L 0 
LI & FUNG “ 26-Mar-Ol ‘ -0.03759534 -0.37135582 0.008112494 40.32 -8.27 I 0 
LI & FUNG “ 20-Aug-01 ‘ -0.12539062 -0.19848784 0.000364551 40.32 -8.27 0 
LIU CHONG HINGINV 16-Aug-Ol ‘ -0.05596412 0.100395054 -0.02005625 62.2 13.61 1. 0 
LUNG KEE BERHDG “ 7-Dec-Ol -0.14110591 -0.10052083 -0.06681441 72.86 24.27 1. 0 
MIDLAND REALITY ~ 17-Sep-Ql ‘ -0.08566999 -1.15580328 0.036957199 30.89 -17.7 1. 0 
MIDLAND REALITY “ 20-Mar-01 ‘ -0.09514898 0.185104731 0.022803902 30.89 -17.7 I 0 
MIRABELLINTL — 19-Nov-Or -0.00695405 -0.67953229 -0.05460555 48.09 -0.5 ]_ 0 
MIRABELL INTL “ 11-Jun-Ol ' -0.12704546 -0.60064331 0.030008251 48.09 -0.5 0 
MIRAMAR INTL & INV 0.037542786 0.945418082 0.006920414 43.69 -4.9 0-4738 -0-526 
MOULIN INTL “ 19-Jul-Ol ‘ -0.16639863 -0.5568892 -0.07292614 36.52 -12.07 0 
MOULIN INTL “ 13-Dec-Ol ‘ 0.178416854 0.32847345 -0.06089869 36.52 -12.07 0 
ORIENT POWER “ 6-Sep-Ol ‘ -0.12748483 -0.08907122 -0.09136115 47.37 -1.22 1_ 0 
ORIENTAL PRESS GP 13-Dec-Ol "0.047518519 -1.72382991 -0.00830976 63.85 15.26 0 
ORIENTAL WATCH “ 18-Dec-Ol ' 0.049731251 ‘ 1.050509597 -0.02672463 35.17 -13.42 1. 0 
PEGASUS INTL “ 22-Mar-Ol “ -0.0056965 -1.16972344 0.004780115 64.15 15.56 1_ 0 
PICO FAR EAST “ 16-Feb-Ol ' 0.055863199 1.489125054 -0.00290227 39.44 -9.15 1. 0 
RISING DEVEL HOLDING 11-Dec-Ol 一 0 . 0 1 1 5 3 6 1 3 0.268300233 -0.04832781 68.73 20.14 1. 0 
ROAD KING INFRA _ 28-Mar-Ol -0.2253802 "-1.77474733 -0.09731695 26.82 -21.77 0.0869 -0.913 
ROAD KING INFRA 20-Jul-m -0.05033456 -2.4037375 -0.02549063 26.82 -21.77 0.0869 -0.913 
SHANGHAI INDL “ 18-Apr-Ol " 0.034261136 0.288891249 0.016911165 59.13 10.54 l_ 0 
SHANGHAI INDL 3-Sep-Ol "0.026376645 0.056031904 0.017549143 59.13 10.54 1 0 
SHELL ELECTRIC MNFG 18-Apr-Ol ~0.07175092 ~1.14324732 0.020456099 70 21.41 1. 0 
SHENZHEN INV “ 24-Apr-Ol " 0.044278538 ‘ 1.378364634 0.103487362 57.19 ^ L 2 
SHUIONCONANDMATS 27-Nov-Ol 一 0 . 0 7 9 3 4 9 9 4 1.612437814 -0.13905532 64.16 15.57 1. 0 
SHUNTAK “ 11-Apr-Ol “ -0.09472969 -1.14099261 -0.02745872 30.79 -17.8 ]_ 0 
SINO LAND 20-Mar-01 一 - 0 . 1 2 2 2 7 1 3 3 “ -1.00053392 -0.02848135 66.26 17.67 0.7172 -0.283 
SINO LAND 0 . 0 2 7 5 9 7 ^ -1.63016659 -0.10759904 52.72' 4.13 0.7172 -0-283 
SUN HUNG KAI CO - 0 . 0 8 7 2 0 ^ -0.1241205 -0.07694566 29.88' -18.71 0-5526 -0.447 
SUN HUNG KAI PROPS — 28-Sep-Ol" -0.01147786 -0.60567231 -0.01787研 44.89 -3.7 1. 0 
TCC INTL 2-Apr-Ol 一 0 . 0 1 0 1 0 6 5 7 4 - -0.5997366 -0.47566462" 12.4 -36.19 0.6798 -0.32 
^ f ^ ^ T L - O . I I I E O ^ 0.822847308 -0.02045235 12.4 -36.19 0.6798 -0.32 
TECHNOLOGY VENTURE “ 26-Apr-Ol -0.04989224 “ -1.8610195 " -0.04993785 16.48 -32.11 ]. 0 
TECHTRONIC INDS “ 3-Sep-Ol “ -0.06000941 " 0.673838437 ‘ 0.0133277 30.77 -17.82 1_ 0 
TELEVISION BROADCAST 11-Apr-Ol ~005152306 -0.23028848 "0016726901 26 -22.59 0.8563 -0.144 
TEXWINCAHDG "“ 18-Dec-Ol 0.12987899"! 0.642665835 0.012611306 55.9 7.31 0 
TEXWINCA “ 18-Jul-Ol "0.020949275 1.235633663 " 0.058583327 55.9 7.31 1. 0 
TIANJIN DEVE ~ 25-Apr-Ol" 0.056439716 -0.21187611 0.057475884 56.88 8.29 l_ 0 
TIANJIN DEVELOP “ 12-Sep-Ol -0.00017283 “ -0.48560677 ' 0.005797996 56.88 8.29 1. 0 
TONIC IND “ 18-Jul-Ol "-0.11881614 “ -5.77164908 “ -0.25285139 50.04 1.45 1 0 
TONIC IND 13-Dec-Ol "o.l 16405341 “ -1.02776249 “ -0.05253448 50.04 1.45 1 0 
TPV TECHNOLOGY “ 19-Apr-Ol "o.l83646712 "2.316305896 "0.193310413 55.24 6.65 1. 0 
TPV TECHNOLOGY “ 6-Sep-Ol "-0.01635946 -0.15403679 "o.Q21343533 55.24 6.65 I 0 
TRISTATE 一 9-Apr-0l' 0.050066389 3.3979587斤 0.104372878 79.6 31.01 0 
TRULY INTL 一 12-Apr-0l' -0.10183523 0.574727892 0.0151928^ 47.56 -1.03 1. 0 
UNIVERSE INTL “ 23-Oct-Ol "-0.00054493 -1.53192524 "-0.03927893 " 23.34 -25.25 0 
VAN SHUNG CHONG 21-Dec-Ol "0.139510943 "4.591408589 "-0.86320006 55.55 6.96 l_ 0 
VARITRONIX INTL “ 24-Sep-Ol "o.l22738128 -0.77536304 -0.07256878 22.5 -26.09 L ^ 
WING ON • 9-Apr-Ol "-0.01396784 0.929974142 0.043239711 61.13 12.54 0 
WONG'S INTL 30-Mar-01 -0.01893703 2.713400473 0.713823409 73.49 24.9 l_ 0 
YIPS CHEMICAL • 28-Jun-Ol "-0.06738408 "o.441175399 -0.07379097 59 10.41 1. 0 
ZHONG HUA INTL 24-Apr-Ol ^003618007 -3.24083131 0.017681368 38.25 -10.34 0.9236 ^ 0 ^ 
ALCO HOLDINGS “ 5-Dec-02 0.007719804 "o. 115548593 " 0.03645026 56.38 1.19 0 
ALPHA GENERAL ~ 26-Jul-02' -0.08297004 0.928717969 -0.12292215 61.19 12.6 0 
APT SATELLITE ~ 8-Apr-02' -0.0297173 -2.77902077 -0.058429石 51.92 3.33 0 
ASM PACIFIC TECH ~ 8-Feb-Q2 -0.01066552 0.071065438 -0.15169179 54.11 5.52 1. 0 
AUTQMETED SYSTEMS ~11-Nov-02 ~^.04452301 ~0.94971356 -0.01861314" 7.8 -40.79 0.6526 -0.347 
BEIJING ENTERPRISES “ ll-Apr-02 0.004693554 "o. 149483928 "0.029839893 “ 62.46 13.87 ]_ 0 
BRIGHTINTLGP 丨 22-Aug-02| 0.101260069| -0.19691459| 0.020665987| 60.551 11.96| l | 0 




Company Name DDate CAR I UD I CE major cmajor O/C cO/C 
CAF? DE CORAL 一 16-Dec-02 0.075536328 0.233603281 0.004957277' 38.93 -9.66 0 
CARRY WEALTH HDG “ 22-Aug-02 ‘ -0.03317715 -0.73950283 -0.06820583' 45 -3.59 1_ 0 
CATHAY PACIFIC -0.12060^ -3.2217086 -0.11327555 46.14 -2.45 0.2896 -0.71 
CATHAY PACIFIC T X i l i ^ 0.025836317 -0.15557818 0.001802026 46.14 -2.45 0.2896 -0.71 
CHAMPION TECH “ 26-Mar-02 ‘ 0.027990085 -0.25408115 -0.06030849 37.13 -11.46 1. 0 
CHEVALERINTL 16-Dec-02 "0.060617168 0.573784587 -0.01415332 50.23 1.64 0 
CHINA EVERBRIGHT 28-Mar-02 ~0.02490963 -1.95848233 -0.14790539 55.47 6.88 1. 0 
CHINA INSURANCE 26-Mar-02 "^0.05238929 -0.91299037 0.022485699 54.79 _ ^ L 0 
CHINA MRCH HOLDINGS 22-Apr-02 -0.08384177 -0.3343058 -0.00832873 53.39 _ ^ L 2 
CHINA RARE EARTH 19-Apr-02 ~0.04819522 -0.97508923 0.000615705 51.57 2.98 1. 0 
CHINA RARE EARTH 19-Sep-02 ~0.13191296 -1.16046734 -0.04567004 51.57 2.98 1_ 0 
CHINA RES ENTREP “ 4-Sep-02 ‘ -0.06032053 -0.12850483 -0.00522755 56.6 8.01 L 2. 
CHINA RES LAND “ 12-Apr-02 ' -0.02781127 0.30650878 -0.06220932 50.43 1.84 1. 0 
CHUN WO — 18-Dec-02 0.01080844 1.088936196 0.013539409 45.05 -3.54 1. 0 
CHUN WO “ 15-Jul-02 “ -0.08727852 ‘ -0.075286 0.032811439 45.05 -3.54 1. 0 
CITIC PACIFIC “ 26-Aug-02 ‘ 0.04500061 1.256691077 0.013262483 28.8 -19.79 1. 0 
CNOOC LTD 23-Aug-02 ~0.03967355 0.111830959 -0.01658311 70.61 22.02 1. 0 
CNPC HK 22-Apr-02 ~0.07108267 -2.26799801 -0.09764314 57.91 9.32 1. 0 
COFCO INTL 8-Apr-02 "o.l29218443 0.859377627 0.088164206 67.33 18.74 1_ 0 
COFCO INTL - 28-Aug-02 ‘ 0.067616904 0.654078455 0.045894384 67.33 18.74 0 
COSCO PACIFIC 27-Mar-02 "0.080808297 0.531122869 0.00730092 54.87 6.28 1. 0 
COSCO PACIFIC - 5-Sep-02 “ 0.07054316 0.348513253 -0.00701862 54.87 6.28 0 
DAIWA ASSOCIATE _28-Nov-02 "5^98581306 -1.08537093 -0.0299955 17.75 -30.84 l_ 0 
DENWAY MOTORS LTD “ 18-Sep-02 0.00242971 ‘ -0.10462074 0.02304604 40.68 -7.91 l_ 0 
ELEC&ELTEKINTL “ 18-Sep-02 0.024167102 • -1.10591899 0.05515819 44.42 -4.17 1. 0 
ELECT &ELTEK INTL “ 27-Feb-02 “ -0.06219499 ‘ 0.107204907 -0.0196232 44.42 -4.17 0 
ESPRIT HOLDINGS — 7-Feb-02 0.272848753 -0.64967343 0 . 0 1 0 7 1 6 ^ 42.23 -6.36 ]. 0 
FAR EAST PHARM TECH “ 23-Oct-02 ' 0.116572722 -0.62542848 0.875800053 50.26 1.67 1. 0 
FOUNTAIN SET “ 12-Dec-02 " 0.141393781 1.063364736 0.028686906 39.26 -9.33 0 
GOLD PEAK PEAK INDUS 20-Jun-02 ~0.12291751 -1.60295254 -0.05336458 25.3 -23.29 1. 2 
GOLDLION HDG “ 17-Sep-02 “ 0.07001261 -0.30459815 -0.10393771 66.09 17.5 1. 0 
GOOD f e l l o w GP LTD “ 25-Oct-02 “ -0.11883427 “ -2.60058924 ‘ 0.019637343 42.81 -5.78 1_ 0 
GREAT EAGLE “ 13-Mar-02 "-0.00275658 " -0.98711124' -0.02397474 58.86 10.27 1 0 
GREAT EAGLE HDG — 12-Sep-02 -0.0498037"! -0.85571406 0.012444— 58.86 10.27 1_ 0 
GUOCO 一 18-0ct-02 -5.4483E-0"? 0.818047165 -1.40426507 41.88 -6.71 ]_ 0 
GZI TRANSPORT — 17-Apr-02 -0.05480947 0.48139278 - 0 . 0 8 4 7 5 ^ 68.66 20.07 0 
HENDERSON LP DEVE 20-Mar-02 ^0.08381283 -0.02489409 -0.02280108 64.47 15.88 1. 0 
HENDERSON LP DEVE “ 3-Oct-02 “ -0.02880803 -0.66972329 -0.06586493 64.47 15.88 1_ 0 
HENGANINTLGP “ 3-Sep-02 "0.081290875 0.596343298 -0.01025481 44.61 -3.98 ]_ 0 
H K ^ C R A F T E N G R 6 - M a r ^ 0.01458381 0.269452389 -0.03143011 32.47 ^ O J U 
HOPEWELL HDG 4-Mar-02 ~0.00593583 -0.91027146 -0.00143221 25.82 -22.77 1. 0 
HOPSON DEVE 18-Apr-02 _ 0.1372538 -1.01925641 -0.01652304 63.62 15.03 1. 0 
JOHNSON ELECTRIC HDG lO-Dec-02 0.034612175 -0.55446157 0.006107277 59.64 11.05 1 0 
KWAHCONMATERIALS “ 18-Sep-02 “ -0.06075197 “ -0.03635765 -0.05616716 65 16.41 0.6725 -0.328 
KERRY PROPERTIES 12-Aug-02 1 .08082813 -0.19041135 0.013076285 63.35 14.76 1. 0 
KERRY PROPERTIES “ 4-Mar-02 "0.020587361 -0.58494518 -0.04943149 63.35 14.76 0 
KIN YAT HDG “ 9-Dec-02 “ -0.05755576 -0.1851274 -0.03856454 66.62 18.03 1. 0 
KINGBOARD CHEMICALS 28-Nov-02 ~ .04036296 -0.3673121 0.009361403 43.86 -4.73 1 0 
KOWLOONMTRBUS 12-Sep-Q2 -0.038506"02 0.346889095 -0.01963811 33.02 -15.57 0.4488 
KWOON CHUNG BUS “ 20-Dec-02 "0.008704281 -0.15695478 -0.12082972 31.96 -16.63 I 0 
LEGEND GP ‘ 12-Nov-02 -0.05293037 ~ 6 0 7 7 3 1 8 2 0.002566983 57.39 _ ^ L 9. 
l e g e n d g r o u p l t d ‘ 23-May-02 ~018564702 ~ 4 8 5 6 5 9 2 8 -0.01292797 57.39 _ O L 9. 
LERADO GROUP 16-Apr-02 0.110095537 -0.3285719 -0.02269953 33.14 -15.45 0 
LIU CHONG HINGINVES ~ 14-Mar-02 -0.08660828 -1.586434^ -0.13253983 62.2 13.61 0 
LUKFOOKHDG — 18-Dec-02_ -0.06790423 0.580480401 -0.03096^ 48.85 0.26 L 0 
LUKS INDL “ 24-Sep-02 0.077090953 “ 0.62341547 “ 0.34528751 39.81 -8.78 1. 0 
LUNG CHEONG INTL 22-Jul-02 ~064223009 -0.68745055 0.014143943 58.18 9.59 0 
LUNG KEE BERHDG “ 13-Dec-02 "o. 173526979 2.139565062 0.024528943 72.86 24.27 1. 0 
MAINLAND HEADWEAR 16-Apr-03 ^ .02404841 0.334713211 0.032078465 67.54 18-95 L 0 
MIDLAND REALTY 20-Mar-02 0.022831763 -0.24549953 -0.03787128 30.89 L 2. 
MOULIN INTL “ 31-Jul-02 -0.18651127 "-0.03895052 -0.05494252 36.52 L 1 
MOULIN INTL ‘ 18-Dec-02 "0.033080244 0.185637499 -0.01334103 36.52 - 1 2 ^ L 2 
MTR CORP 1-Mar-02| 0.01768Q152| 1.3950747881 0.0038457161 76.14| 27.55| l | 0 




Company Name D Date CAR I UP I CE major cmajor O/C cO/C 
NGAIHING HONG “ 7-Oct-02 0.115871437 6.034481843 0.136306452 51 2.41 ]_ 0 
ORIENT OVERSEAS INTL “ 15-Mar-02 ‘ -0.0987812 -1.7736504 -0.2350019 73.29 24.7 0 
ORIENTAL WATCH “ 18-Jul-02 ‘ -0.19078244 -0.33506151 -0.05722092' 35.17 -13.42 0 
ORIENTAL WATCH 18-Dec-02 "5.061236895 _0.12517209 -0.01658808 35.17 -13.42 0 
OXFORD PROPS “ 22-May-02 ‘ 0.090207359 -0.75574756 -0.05720962' 89.16 40.57 0 
PERFECTECH INDL “ 3-Apr-02 ‘ 0.138856246 1.899471778 -0.0002689 60.38 11.79 1. 0 
PERFECTECH INTL “ 18-Sep-02 ‘ -0.01219705 -0.20735083 -0.00906431 60.38 11.79 1. 0 
ROAD KING INFRA 22-Jul-02 0.02562786 2.19013866T -0.01083717 26.82 -21.77 0.0869 -0.913 
SAFETY GODOWN “ 15-Jul-02 ‘ 0.00500506 -0.45163426 -0.00788191 47.81 -0.78 1 0 
SHANGHAI INDL _ 15-Apr-02 -0.06446536 -0.12869333 0.012343"T87 59.13 10.54 I 0 
SHANGHAI RL ESTATE “ 25-Apr-02 ‘ -0.06966712 -0.44575851 0.025397504 56.38 7.79 1. 0 
SHAW BROTHERS HK _ 4-Dec-02 ‘ 0.15717329 -0.71410015 -0.01212966 74.58 25.99 ]_ 2 
SHELL ELECTRIC MNFG 18-Apr-02 ~0.Q3491532 -0.13226196 1 . 1 8 8 9 5 4 5 5 70 21.41 1. 0 
SHUN TAK HOLDING 23-Sep-02 "o.ll2231968 0.939087805 0.073150772 30.79 -17.8 1. 0 
SILVER GRANT INTL 一 24-Apr-02 -0.014445^ 0.7042339"^ 0.04346842 15.15 -33.44 1. 0 
SINO GOLF “ 5-Jul-02 ‘ 0.095519691 -0.21970007 -0.17262456 66.26 17.67 ]_ 0 
SINQPEC KANTON 2-Apr-02 0.064750015 -0.79578544 -0.0626745 55.06 6.47 0.7265 -0-274 
SKY WORLD DIGITAL “ 17-Dec-02 ‘ -0.062689 -2.45989846 0.050397569 39.09 -9.5 l_ 0 
STARLITE “ 18-Jul-02_ -0.04732747 2.93757598 0.166138902 51.66 3.07 l_ 0 
SW KINGWAY C A P I T A L ~ 6-Mar-02 -0.04895672 -1.39138199 0.005401969 48.26 -0.33 0.7422 -0.258 
SWIRE PACIFIC A " T X ^ j j ^ 0.028034348 0.14039801 0.012940225 52.2 3.61 0.5546 -0.445 
S W ^ PACIFIC B ~8-Aug-02 ~ 0 3 8 4 8 3 6 6 ~ 4 5 5 4 4 9 1 5 "0.027367532 52.2 3.61 0.5546 -0.445 
TAI SANG LAND DEVE 28-Mar-Q2 "^0.02471543 ~265544812 "^.07343134 6.42 1. 0 
TAI SANG LAND DEVE 6-Sep-02 "0.002271368 -0.7298119 -0.03236511 55.01 6.42 1. 0 
TCC INTL 25-Apr-02 - 0 . 0 0 6 1 2 ^ -1.43305878 0.493490759 12.4 -36.19 0.6798 -0.32 
TCC INTL 0 . 0 0 8 3 7 ^ -0.27247648 -0.04049391 12.4' -36.19 0.6798 -0.32 
TCLINTL ~ 14-Mar-02 -0.03038768 -0.84038809 -0.03936311 54.94 6.35 l_ 0 
TECHTRONIC INDS 24-Apr-02 "0.030593742 ~ .43391627 ~017753475 -17.82 0 
TECHTRONIC INDS 8-Aug-02 ~0.21809631 -1.02988543 0.020492427 30.77 -17.82 1. 0 
TEXWINCA HDG “ 18-Dec-02 0.217171249 ' 0.531662198 0.003996833 55.9 7.31 1. 0 
TIANJINDEVE “ 18-Sep-02 "0.077052312 “ -0.90463789 ‘ 0.027517521 56.88 8.29 1. 0 
TRULY INTL “ 23-Aug-02 " 0.024158515 " 0.1682652 ‘ 0.00050899 47.56 -1.03 I 0 
UNITED PACIFIC INDS 一 16-Dec-02 0.441741844 -7.02105143 0.002066研 23.34 -25.25 l_ 0 
VARITRONIX INTL “ 22-Aug-02 " 0.093846749 -1.41053403 -0.00367528 22.5 -26.09 ]_ 0 
WING ON COINTL “ 12-Sep-02 "o.415693185 " 3.676016551 ‘ 0.206112969 61.13 12.54 ]_ 0 
WING ON INTL “ 12-Apr-02 " 0.014097718 “ 1.190256722 ‘ 0.085883797 61.13 12.54 0 
YANGTZEKIANG GAR ~ 16-Jul-02 -0.13220072 -0.11636097 -0.12566385 46.38 -2.21 ]_ 0 
YIP'S CHEMICAL ~ 13-Nov-Q2 0.230456079 1.4809841 石 0.081369127 59 10.41 l_ 0 
YUEYUEN INDL 21-Jan-02| 0.0626686331 1.2665318271 0.0004689641 24.71 -23.89| 0.4818| -0-518 
Notes: cmajor = centered major cO/C = centered O/C 
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